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I. INTRODUCTION
The military establishment is, of course, a necessary organ of government, but
the reach of its power must be carefully limited lest the balance between freedom
and order be upset. The maintenance of the balance is made more difficult by
the fact that while the military serves the vital function of preserving the existence
of the nation, it is, at the same time, the one element of government that exercises
a type of authority not easily assimilated in free society.
Earl Warren,
Chief Justice of the United States[
o Copyright, 1986, David J. Cony.
* Member of the 1985 graduating class of Osgoode Hall Law School. Presently a member
of the Alberta Bar with the law firm Fenerty, Robertson, Fraser & Hatch. Former Canadian Naval
Officer 1973-82.
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In a constitutional democracy, in which certain basic rights are held
to be fundamental to all persons, the military is a necessary evil. The
constitution guarantees that democratic rule will not develop into a tyranny
of the majority over the minority. The constitution defines the limits
of democratic rule: individual rights are sacred and the will of the ma-
jority shall not tread upon them.
Military society stands in marked contrast to the constitutional
democracy. The fundamental objective of the armed forces is military
efficiency to create an effective and integrated fighting force. All private
considerations must give way to the fundamental goals of the military
organization. Individual rights of service personnel, therefore, are not
sacred. They are sacrificed for the sake of military efficiency.
The contrast between the military and a constitutional democracy
is most clearly reflected in their respective legal systems. It reaches the
point of dilemma when the two legal systems come into contact: when
the military is subjected to judicial review by the civilian courts. This
requires the courts to tread a fine line, balancing the exigencies of the
armed forces with the fundamental rights of individual service personnel.
Canada matured as a constitutional democracy on April 17, 1982.
With the adoption of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,2
the courts for the first time have been asked to give serious consideration
to the rights of those who are subjected to the military judicial process.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect that the Charter will
have on military law in Canada. Will the civil courts be reluctant to
interfere with the administration and enforcement of military law? Will
they defer to military tribunals, or will the courts intervene when military
justice violates individual rights? These are a few of the many questions
that remain to be answered over the years as the military is subjected
to review under the Charter.
In examining the above questions, this paper will draw on the
extensive jurisprudence of the United States, which has subjected the
military to constitutional scrutiny over a 200-year history. Canada clearly
must chart her own course, but in so doing, the many issues faced and
resolved in the United States, and the mistakes that have been made,
will be a valuable starting point. Before considering those cases, however,
I will begin by examining the state of Canadian law governing review
of the military prior to the Charter.
2 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
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II. REVIEW OF PRE-CHARTER LAW GOVERNING THE
MILITARY
A. The Common Law
The federal government is granted sole jurisdiction over the "Militia,
Military and Naval Service, and Defence" pursuant to section 91(7) of
the Constitution Ac 1867.3 In exercise of this jurisdiction, Parliament
has enacted the National Defence Act,4 which is the governing statute
of the Canadian Forces. The Second Division of that statute contains
the Code of Service Discipline, which is a complete code of military law
applicable to persons under service jurisdiction.5 Also, under section 12
of the National Defence Act, the Governor-in-Council and the Minister
of National Defence are empowered to make regulations for the or-
ganization, training, discipline, efficiency, administration, and government
of the Forces, so long as such regulations are not inconsistent with the
National Defence Act. Under this authority, the government has promul-
gated the Queen's Regulations and Orders (QR & Os). The QR & Os amplify
the Code of Service Discipline and serve as the authoritative manual for
military law in Canada.
The jurisdiction of the civil courts is not affected by the Code of
Sevice Discipline, and persons subject to the Code may be triable in
both military and civil jurisdictions. 6 In general, the law of Canada, which
applies to all citizens, also applies to members of the Forces. Therefore,
the person who joins the service is still within the jurisdiction of the
civil courts and, as a member of the Forces, is also within the jurisdiction
of the military courts.
In determining original jurisdiction, one must look at the three types
of offences that apply to service personnel: first, those offences that are
triable only by the civil courts; second, those that are triable only by
a military tribunal; and third, those that are within the jurisdiction of
both military and civil courts. In the first type of offence, when charged
with murder, manslaughter, or sexual assault, the service person must
be tried by the civil court, and cannot be tried under military law. 7 The
second type of offence involves those matters that are purely of a military
nature.8 These include absence without leave, desertion, disobedience of
3 (U.K.), 30 & 31 VicL, c. 3.
4 R.S.C. 1970, c. N-4.
5 Ibid s. 55 deals with the jurisdiction of the Code of Service Discipline over persons. In addition
to military personnel, the Code also applies to civilians accompanying a unit of the Armed Forces,
and alleged spies for the enemy.
6 Ibid s. 61.
7 bid s. 60.
8 Ibid Part V, ss 62-119, 121, 122.
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a lawful command, mutiny, insubordination, and so on. The third type
of offence involves matters of the civil law that are brought into the
Code of Service Discipline under section 120 of the National Defence
Act,9 or certain offences under the Code of Service Discipline that may
be triable in the civil courts with the consent of the Commanding Officer
of the complainant.' 0 Under section 120 of the National Defence Act,
a member of the Canadian Forces may be tried under military law for
any offence under the Criminal Code or any other act of the Parliament
of Canada. Also, offences that are triable in civil courts, with the consent
of the complainant's Commanding Officer, may be triable by military
tribunal under section 120.
In the case of offences brought under the Code of Service Discipline
through section 120, the civil courts maintain jurisdiction whether or
not the accused person is tried by a military tribunal. Section 61(1) of
the National Defence Act states that "Nothing in the Code of Service
Discipline affects the jurisdiction of any civil court to try a person for
any offence triable by that court." Therefore, a member of the forces
can be brought before a civil court and tried for a matter that has already
been disposed of by the military under section 120 of the National Defence
Act. The Act requires that the civil court shall, in awarding punishment,
take into account any punishment that was imposed by the service
tribunal." Additionally, when the punishment of the military court was
a sentence of imprisonment, upon conviction or acquittal by the civil
court the military sentence is remitted.' However, these provisions do
not eliminate the problem of double jeopardy and it would appear, at
first glance, that section 61 of the National Defence Act violates section
10(h) of the Charter, which provides that:
Any person charged with an offence has the right ... if finally acquitted of the
offence, not to be tried for it again and, if finally found guilty and punished for
the offence, not to be tried or punished for it again.
The civil courts havejurisdiction to review matters decided by military
tribunals. Persons found guilty under military law have a right of appeal
to the Court Martial Appeal Court (CMAC) regarding either the sentence
9 Ibid s. 120(1): Offences Punishable by Ordinary Law. "An act or omission
(a) that takes place in Canada and is punishable under Part XII of this Act, the Crhindal
Code or any other Act of the Parliament of Canada; or
(b) that takes place outside Canada and would, if it had taken place in Canada, be punishable
under Part XII of this Act, the Criminal Code or any other Act of the Parliament of
Canada."
10 Ibid Part XII, ss 243-263.
11 Ibid s. 61(2).
12 Ibid s. 61(3).
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imposed or any matter of law.13 The CMAC is made up of civilian judges
who are selected from the Federal Court of Canada. 4 There is a further
right of appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, if the matter is dismissed
by the CMAC. 15
The statutory right of appeal is in addition to, and not in derogation
of, rights that service personnel have under the law of Canada.16 Therefore,
members of the Forces may apply to the civil court, asking the court
to exercise its inherent supervisory power under the prerogative writs.
While the civil courts have expanded the scope of review over inferior
tribunals in recent years, they have been reluctant to interfere in military
matters, unless the military tribunal has acted without jurisdiction or
has exceeded its jurisdiction.
Until recently, the civil courts would not inquire at all into matters
involving the discipline of members of the Armed Forces. The attitude
of the courts was based on obiter dictum in the case of Sutton v. Johnstone,7
decided by the Court of Exchequer in 1786. The plaintiff, Captain Sutton,
was the Commanding Officer of Her Majesty's Ship Isis, and Johnstone
was his superior commander in charge of the squadron. The British were
at war with the French, and in April of 1781 the Isis was damaged
in a naval engagement against the enemy. The French fleet withdrew,
and Johnstone ordered the Isis to pursue the enemy. Sutton did not obey
the order because of the condition of his ship. Consequently, he was
arrested and tried by court martial for disobedience of orders. When
Sutton was acquitted, he brought a civil action against Johnstone for
malicious prosecution. The matter was tried twice in the lower courts,
and Sutton was awarded damages on both occasions. Johnstone appealed
to the Court of Exchequer, which reversed the judgment at trial. Upon
appeal to the House of Lords, 8 the judgment of the Court of Exchequer
was affirmed on the ground that Johnstone had probable cause for the
prosecution. Although this was enough to dispose of the matter, Lord
Mansfield and Lord Loughborough stated in obiter that an action cannot
be maintained by a subordinate officer against a commander for an act
13 Ibid s. 197.
14 Ibid s. 201(2), (5). Specifically, at least four judges must be from the Federal Court; other
judges from a superior court of criminal jurisdiction may be appointed. Three judges constitute
a quorum.
15 Ibid s. 208. Appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada is only allowed on a question of
law. It is granted as of right when there is a dissent in the Court Martial Appeal Court. Otherwise,
leave must be granted by the Supreme Court of Canada.
16 Ibid s. 198.
17 1 T.R. 510, 99 E.R. 1215. For an interesting analysis of the case, see W.S. Holdsworth,
"The Case of Sutton v. Johnstone" (1903) 19 L.Q. Rev. 222.
18 (1787), 1 T.R. 784, 99 E.R. 1377.
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done in the course of discipline and under powers legally incident to
the situation.' 9 The dictum of Lord Mansfield has been cited since that
time for the broad proposition that the civil courts will not inquire into
the exercise of military discipline.
In Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby (1866),20 the plaintiff serviceman sued
for damages for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. The court
held that even assuming there was clear malice and absence of probable
cause, the plaintiff, Dawkins, had no cause of action.2' A subsequent
action was brought by the same parties, and heard by the Court of
Exchequer in 1873.22 Kelly C.B. delivered the judgment of the Court
and dismissed the plaintiffs action. He stated:
With reference, therefore, to such questions, which are purely of a military character,
the reasons of Lord Mansfield and the other judges in Sutton v. Johnstone ...
are ... authorities to show that a case involving questions of military discipline
and military duty alone are cognizable only by a military tribunal, and not by
a court of law.23
The Canadian courts have followed the general approach of the
English courts. In Ex parte Fogan (19 19),24 the plaintiff serviceman was
convicted by court martial for the offence of drunkenness committed
while in a private home. It was Fogan's third offence, and he was sentenced
to nine months' imprisonment at hard labour. Fogan applied to the civil
court by way of certiorari. In dismissing the action, the New Brunswick
Supreme Court held that certiorari was not available to review a matter
of procedural error made by a military tribunal. The military tribunal
in this case had not exceeded its jurisdiction, and therefore the civil court
refused to intervene.
One of the leading Canadian cases exemplifying the 'hands off'
attitude of the civil courts regarding matters of military discipline is Regina
and Archer v. White (1956).25 In that case, a former Constable of the
Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) was convicted of four disciplinary
charges under the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act.26 White applied
for certiorari before the Supreme Court of British Columbia in order
to remove the record of convictions held by RCMP Superintendent Archer.
19 Ibid at 1226, 1243.
20 4 F. & F. 806, 176 E.R. 800 (Ct.Comm.Pleas) [hereinafter cited to E.R.].
2! Ibid at 812.
22 Dawkns v. Lord Rokeby (1872), [1873] L.R. 8 Q.B. 255.
23 Ibid at 271.
24 46 N.B.R. 370, 48 D.L.R. 194 (S.C.).
25 [1956] S.C.R. 154.
26 R.S.C. 1970, c. R-9.
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The trial court recited the common law principle that the civil courts
have no power to interfere with matters of military conduct and discipline.
In dismissing White's application, the court held that disciplinary matters
within the RCMP are akin to those before a military tribunal and, therefore,
the same principles apply. Certiorari is not applicable to decisions of
the RCMP disciplinary tribunal when that body has acted within its
statutory powers. White appealed to the Court of Appeal of British
Columbia, which held that certiorari was applicable in this case, because
the military cases are not relevant to RCMP disciplinary matters. Su-
perintendent Archer appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.
The Supreme Court was unanimous in allowing Archer's appeal
and restoring the judgment at trial. However, only Abbott J. agreed with
the trial judge that the courts have no power to interfere with internal
matters of discipline within the RCMP. The majority held that the right
of the court to intervene by way of certiorari is undoubted, both in respect
of the military and the RCMP. In this case, however, there was nothing
in the material before the court to sustain charges of fraud, bias, or
want of jurisdiction.
Rand J. expressed the opinion that the court would be reluctant
to interfere with proceedings before the RCMP tribunal:
If, within the scope of authority granted, wrongs are done by individuals, and
that is not beyond possibility, the appeal must be to others than to civil tribunals,
or as in the case of the Army, they must be looked upon as a necessary price
paid for the vital purposes of the force.
27
Notwithstanding the general reluctance of the civil courts to interfere
in military matters, when the exercise of military authority denies service
personnel their fundamental common law rights and liberties, the civil
court will intervene. This principle was followed in Rex v. Thompson
(No.]) (1945),28 which stands as one of the few cases in which the civil
courts have been willing to interfere in the exercise of military discipline.
In this case, Thompson applied to the civil courts by way of habeas
corpus. Thompson was a Non-Commissioned Officer in the Canadian
Army. He was arrested on charges of theft of public property and improper
possession of public property. He was detained in military custody for
two and one-half months, and finally was brought before a District Court
Martial. Thompson submitted that the Court Martial did not have
jurisdiction to hear the case. The Court Martial held that it did have
jurisdiction and proceeded with the trial. The proceedings were interrupted
by the accused's application for habeas corpus brought before the Ontario
27 Supra, note 25 at 160.
28 [1946] O.R. 77, 4 D.L.R. 579, 86 C.C.C. 193 (H.C.).
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High Court. LeBel J. held that the Court Martial had acted without
jurisdiction and ordered that Thompson be released from custody. He
examined the relevant provisions of the Army Act29 and the military rules
of procedure. The jurisdiction of the Court Martial was conditioned upon
a prior hearing of the charge by the Commanding Officer (CO). The
Co must exercise his or her discretion by either dismissing the charge,
disposing of the case summarily, referring the matter to proper military
authority, or remanding the case to trial by court martial. Because the
requisite hearing by the Commanding Officer had not been held, LeBel
J. found that the Court Martial did not have jurisdiction to hear the
matter.
Following his release from custody, Thompson was transferred to
another regiment. There he was re-arrested on the same charges.
Thompson again petitioned the civil courts, this time by way of prohibition
in order to prevent his new Commanding Officer from taking further
proceedings on the same charge.30 The Ontario High Court granted
Thompson's application, and in so doing Urquhart J. expressed some
concern that the new Commanding Officer knew little of Thompson
apart from the charges pending before him. Therefore, the Commanding
Officer could not reasonably exercise his discretion regarding the matter.
Urquhart J. held that Thompson had good cause for being apprehensive
about his hearing before the new Commanding Officer and his trial by
court martial.
Rex v. Thompson is an exceptional case in a long line of Anglo-
Canadian jurisprudence. Although Urquhart J. in Rex v. Thompson (No.2)31
found that there was a reasonable apprehension of bias, there was no
express finding that the new Commanding Officer had acted without
jurisdiction. The statutory basis of the Commanding Officer's discretion
does not require familiarity with the personnel brought before him or
her. Clearly Urquhart J. was more concerned about the abuse of process,
in light of Thompson's initial release by way of habeas corpus, than
he was about the legality of the proceedings under the new Commanding
Officer.
In Canada, service personnel do not entirely give up their common
law rights upon enlistment. However, these rights may be expressly taken
away by statute,32 or by order-in-council under the War Measures Act,33
29 44 & 45 Vict., c. 9, as am. This was, in fact, the Army Act of the United Kingdom, which
governed the Canadian Army as provided by the Canadian Militia Act, R.S.C. 1927, c. 132.
30 Rex v. Thompson (No.2) (1946), 4 D.L.R. 591 (Ont. C.A.) at 598-99.
31 Ibid
32 Supra, note 28.
33 S.C. 1914 (2d Sess.), c. 2. See Re Gray (1918), 57 S.C.R. 150, 42 D.L.R. 1.
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which grants the federal Cabinet the authority to suspend common law
rights during a national emergency.
The power of the federal Cabinet to authorize conscription in time
of war was upheld by the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada
in Re Gray (1918).34 Anglin J. quoted with approval the judgment of
Lord Atkinson in R. v. Halliday.35 Anglin J. stated:
However precious the personal liberty of the subject may be, there is something
for which it may well be, to some extent, sacrificed by legal enactment, namely,
national success in the war, or escape from national plunder or enslavement. It
is not contended in this case that personal liberty of the subject can be invaded
arbitrarily at the mere whim of the executive. What is contended is that the executive
has been empowered during the war, for paramount objects of State, to invade
by legislative enactment that liberty in certain states of fact.
36
Once a person enlists in the military, or is conscripted into service,
he or she becomes subject to the Code of Service Discipline. That person
is subject to the Code at all times and in all places and, consequently,
his or her liberty is considerably constrained.3 7 While members of the
Armed Forces may apply for review of a military matter, the scope of
review is much narrower than the civil courts have exercised for other
inferior tribunals.38 The courts have been particularly loathe to interfere
in military matters during a national emergency, and pursuant to sweeping
powers granted under the War Measures Act, cabinet powers to suspend
common law rights entirely have been held to be intra vires. Generally
speaking, under the common law, it is clear that military personnel have
very limited rights of review.
B. The Canadian Bill of Rights
When the Canadian Bill of Rights39 was enacted in 1960, it offered
tremendous scope for review of military action by the civil courts, that
is, if they had been willing to take up the gauntlet. At the court-martial
level, military lawyers cited the Bill of Rights on numerous occasions,
but with little success. Only four Bill of Rights cases were heard by the
Court Martial Appeal Court; all were denied except one, which was
decided on other grounds. Only one of these cases, MacKay v. The Queen,4o
34 Re Gray, ibid
35 (1917), [1917] A.C. 260 (H.L.).
36 Re Gray, supra, note 33 at 182.
37 McArthur v. The King (1943), [1943] Ex. C.R. 77, 3 D.L.R. 225.
38 Under the writ of certiorari, the court will review for error of law on the face of the record,
in addition to reviewing for jurisdictional error.
39 S.C. 1960, c. 44.
40 (1980), [19801 2 S.C.R. 370, 114 D.L.R. (3d) 393 [hereinafter cited to D.L.R.].
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was appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. It was decided in 1980,
twenty years after the Bill of Rights was enacted.
The three cases prior to MacKay raised very specific issues in which
the accused argued that a certain provision of the QR & Os violated the
Bill of Rights. In Platt v. The Queen, ' the accused challenged article 111.60
of QR & Os, which states that a person charged is not entitled to have
a defending officer appointed until after a court martial has been ordered
by the convening authority. The Court Martial Appeal Court rejected
Platt's claim that the article violated his right to counsel as provided
by section 2(c) of the Bill of Rights.42
The two cases that followed, Robinson v. The Queen (1971)43 and
Nye v. The Queen (1972),44 both challenged article 112.54(3) of QR &
Os. A General or Disciplinary Court Martial45 is composed of military
officers who have minimal legal training. A Judge Advocate is appointed
to assist the court martial and to give an opinion upon all matters of
law and procedure. QR & Os, article 112.54(3) allows the court to disregard
the opinion of the Judge Advocate when it has "very weighty reasons"
for so doing. In both Robinson and Nye, the court martial disregarded
the legal opinion of the Judge Advocate on a matter of law. In both
cases, it was argued that article 112.54(3) denies the accused a fair trial
according to law, 46 and denies the right to equality before the law,47
and due process of law.48 Therefore, it was submitted, the accused was
denied the right to a hearing in accordance with the principles of
fundamental justice pursuant to the Bill of Rights.49 In Robinson, the appeal
was allowed on other grounds; however, the Court Martial Appeal Court
implied that it would favour a Bill of Rights challenge to article 112.54(3)
if the matter arose in the future. When the issue was raised again in
Nye v. The Queen, the Court Martial Appeal Court held that article
41 (1963), 2 C.M.A.R. 213.
42 Section 2(c)(ii) of the Canadian Bill of Rights, supra, note 39 provides that a person who
has been arrested or detained shall have the right to retain and instruct counsel without delay.
43 3 C.M.A.R. 43.
44 3 C.M.A.R. 85.
45 The General Court Martial and Disciplinary Court Martial are discussed later in the text.
46 Section 2(f) of the Canadian Bill of Rights, supra, note 39 provides that a person charged
with a criminal offence shall not be deprived "of the right to be presumed innocent until proved
guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal,
or of the right to reasonable bail without just cause."
47 Ibid s. l(b) provides for "the right of the individual to equality before the law and the
protection of the law."
48 Ibid s. 2(e) provides that a person shall not be deprived "of the right to a fair hearing
in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice for the determination of his rights and
obligations."
49 Ibid s. 2(e).
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112.54(3) did not infringe the Bill of Rights. Under that provision, the
members of the court martial could only disregard the opinion of the
Judge Advocate on a question of law when they had been convinced
that his or her opinion was ill-founded. Therefore, according to the Appeal
Court, the accused was not denied due process of law and fundamental
justice.
MacKay v. The Queen (1980) 50 was the only major challenge to
the military system under the Canadian Bill of Rights. In that case, Private
MacKay was charged with trafficking in drugs under the Narcotic Control
Act.51 He was suspected of selling marijuana to fellow soldiers on his
base located at Esquimalt, British Columbia. The offence was brought
under the Code of Service Discipline, pursuant to section 120 of the National
Defence Act.52 MacKay was convicted by a Standing Court Martial on
a number of counts and was sentenced to sixty days' detention. On appeal
to the Court Martial Appeal Court, all but one of the convictions was
affirmed. Private MacKay appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.
On appeal, the accused argued that section 120 of the National
Defence Act was inoperative under the Bill of Rights, in that he was tried
under military law for offences under the general law. A civilian would
be tried in civil court for the same offences.53 Therefore, MacKay argued
that he was denied equality before the law, pursuant to section l(b)
of the Bill of Rights.54 In addition, MacKay submitted that section 120
denied members of the Armed Forces the right to a fair hearing by
an independent and impartial tribunal as contemplated by section 2(f)
of the Bill of Rights.55 The Supreme Court dismissed MacKay's appeal
by a majority of seven to two.
Ritchie J. delivered the majority opinion. He pointed out that the
National Defence Act was enacted by Parliament under section 91(7)
of the British North America Act, 1867 (now the Constitution Act, 1867).56
That section gives Parliament the authority to enact legislation to control
behaviour and discipline in the Forces and to establish courts to enforce
this legislation. In reiterating the 'valid federal objective' test,57 Ritchie
J. held that legislation that deals with a particular class of people does
50 Supra, note 40.
51 R.S.C. 1970, c. N-I.
52 Supra, note 4.
53 Supra, note 9.
54 Supra, note 47.
55 Supra, note 46.
56 Supra, note 3.
57 In Bliss v. A.G. Can. (1978), [1979] 1 S.C.R. 183, 92 D.L.R. (3d) 417, Ritchie J., for the
majority, invoked the valid federal objective test.
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not offend the Canadian Bill of Rights if, as here, the legislation had
been "enacted for the purpose of achieving a valid federal objective."58
In my opinion, the MacKay case was wrongly decided. Ritchie J.
does not explain the meaning of a valid federal objective. He appears
to have applied a division of powers test and suggested that once the
legislation in question is found to be intra vires Parliament, it does not
violate the Bill of Rights. That being the extent of the inquiry, Ritchie
J. does not consider whether a military trial for civil offences serves
a valid objective under the provisions of the Bill of Rights.
McIntyre J., in a separate concurring judgment, does attempt to
provide some meaning to the valid federal objective test within the context
of the Bill of Rights. He states that any departure from the general
application of the law "should be countenanced only where necessary
for that attainment of desirable social objectives, and then only to the
extent necessary in the circumstances to make possible the attainment
of such objectives."59 McIntyre J. goes on to hold that in this case, the
drug offences were sufficiently related to the service to justify treatment
under military law. The offences, except one, occurred on military property
and attacked the standards of discipline and efficiency of the service
and, therefore, were properly tried by court martial.
While McIntyre J. is to be applauded for developing a meaningful
test under the Bill of Rights, one must criticize him for not applying
that test. Without proof of the fact, McIntyre J. held that military
prosecution of drug offences is necessary to maintain the requisite objective
of military discipline. Nevertheless, the test proposed by McIntyre J. is
a useful one that attempts to establish an appropriate balance between
constitutional rights and the legitimate and necessary interests of the
state. This balancing approach in MacKay suggests an appropriate test,
to be discussed later, for the application of section 1 of the Charter to
constitutional claims.
In regard to the other ground of appeal, Ritchie J. held that a trial
by court martial did not deprive an accused of a fair and public hearing
by an independent and impartial tribunal. According to the majority,
there was no evidence in the record to suggest that the President of
the Court Martial acted in anything but an independent and impartial
manner. Ritchie J. stated further that the President's experience in the
military and his position in the Judge Advocate General's branch suggest
that he was well qualified to adjudicate matters of military law. 60
58 Supra, note 40 at 410.
59 Ibid at 424.
60 Ibid at 411. McIntyre J. makes the same point at 421.
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Ritchie J.'s approach implies that an accused must show actual bias
or lack of independence before a tribunal would be found to offend
section 2(f) of the Bill of Rights. If this is the approach contemplated
by Ritchie J., it clearly ignores a long history of cases decided under
the common law.6' In those cases, the court would intervene in a decision
of an inferior tribunal when there was a reasonable apprehension of bias.
The party seeking review need not go so far as to establish actual bias
by a member of the tribunal. In his dissenting judgment in MacKay,
Laskin CJ.C. points to a number of factors that would give rise to a
reasonable apprehension of bias. 62
The MacKay case is part of a long line of disappointing and poorly
reasoned cases under the Bill of Rights.63 In particular, the valid federal
objective test and the MacKay case itself have been subjected to
considerable criticism.64 In short, the Bill of Rights does not subject the
military system of justice to review by the civil courts. It remains to
be seen whether the Charter will provide any greater protection for the
rights of service personnel.
III. THE CHARTER
In deciding a claim under the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms,65 the court must answer three fundamental questions. First,
does the Charter apply? Second, have any of the rights as guaranteed
by the Charter been infringed? Third, and this question is probably the
most difficult, is the infringement a reasonable limitation of the person's
rights, pursuant to section 1 of the Charter?
A. Does the Charter Apply to Military Law?
Section 32(1) of the Charter states that the Charter applies:
(a) to the Parliament and government of Canada in respect of all matters within
the authority of Parliament including all matters relating to the Yukon Territory
and Northwest Territories .... 66
61 Metropolitan Properties v. Lannon (1968), 11969] 1 Q.B. 577 (C.A.); Committee for Justice
and Liberty v. National Energy Board (1976), [1978] 1 S.C.R. 369; R v. PickersgilZ Ex P. Smith
(1970), 14 D.L.R. (3d) 717 (Man. Q.B.).
62 Supra, note 40 at 401-2.
63 The other cases are: A.G. Can. v. Lavell (1973), [1974] S.C.R. 1349, 38 D.L.R. (3d) 481;
R v. Burnshine (1974), [1975] 1 S.C.R. 693, 44 D.L.R. (3d) 584; Prata v. Minister of Manpower
and hmmigration (1975), [1976] 1 S.C.R. 376, 52 D.L.R. (3d) 383; and Bliss v. A.G. Can. (1978),
supra, note 57.
64 See J. MacPherson, "Developments in Constitutional Law: The 1978-79 Term" (1980)
1 Supreme Court L. Rev. 77 at 111ff; M. Gold, "Case Commentary on Mackay v. The Queen"
(1982) 60 Can. B. Rev. 137.
65 Supra, note 2.
66 Ibid
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This clearly includes the Canadian Armed Forces, which completely falls
within the authority of Parliament and the government of Canada.
Section 32(1) is subject to qualification: pursuant to section 33,
Parliament may expressly declare in an Act of Parliament that the Act
or certain sections of the Act shall operate notwithstanding section 2,
and sections 7 through 15 of the Charter. To date, this override power
has not been exercised with respect to the National Defence Act. Until
such a declaration takes place, the men and women of the military are
protected under the provisions of the Charter.
One provision of the Charter, the right to a trial by jury under section
1 l(f), specifically excludes trials under military law tried before a military
tribunal.67 In drafting the Charter, therefore, Parliament turned its mind
to the military legal system. In so doing, Parliament chose to deny service
personnel only that right guaranteed under section 11 (f) of the Charter.
By implication, Parliament must have intended that the remaining
provisions of the Charter would apply to military law.
B. Supremacy Clause: Section 52(1)
Section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 198268 explicitly states that:
The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that
is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the
inconsistency, of no force or effect.
The Charter is part of the "Constitution of Canada" 69 and, therefore,
any law which is inconsistent with the Charter is "of no force or effect."
This clearly includes the National Defence Act and any other law that
applies to the Canadian Forces.
Certainly, section 52(1) refers to the "Constitution of Canada" as
a whole, which includes the authority of Parliament to enact legislation
governing the military70 and the limiting provisions of the Charter. Before
67 Section 1 l(f) of the Charter provides:
Any person charged with an offence has the right...
(f) except in the case of an offence under military law tried before a military tribunal, to
the benefit of trial by jury where the maximum punishment for the offence is imprisonment
for five years or a more severe punishment.
68 Being Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
69 Ibid s. 52(2).
70 Pursuant to s. 91(7) of the Constitution Ac 1867, supra, note 3. Parliament has jurisdiction
over "Militia, Military and Naval Service, and Defence."
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section 52(1) will apply, the court must not only find that a right or
freedom as guaranteed by the Charter has been infringed, but also that
the law in question is not a "reasonable limit... as can be demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society," pursuant to section 1 of the
Charter. Therefore, any provision of military law that violates the Charter
and is not saved by section 1 will be struck down by the civil courts.
It will be of "no force or effect" both with respect to the matter before
the court and any pending or future actions by the military authorities.
Section 52(1) embodies the previous practice of the civil courts in
determining a constitutional matter. Once the constitutional validity of
the National Defence Act is properly placed in issue, the presiding tribunal
must determine the constitutional question before proceeding with the
case.71
In addition to the traditional remedy embodied in section 52(1) of
the Constitution Act, 1982, section 24(1) of the Charter provides for a
new remedy that is applicable only for a breach of the provisions of
the Charter.
C. Remedy Clause: Section 24(1)
Section 24(1) of the Charter provides that:
Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have been infringed
or denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy
as the court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances. 7 2
The effect of section 24(1) is two-fold: first, it provides standing
to any members of the Armed Forces whose rights or freedoms as
guaranteed by the Charter have been infringed; and second, it grants
the "court of competent jurisdiction" broad powers to grant a remedy
once a matter has been found to infringe the Charter.
The issue of standing under the Charter is one that is yet to be
determined by the civil courts. It is not clear to what extent the rights
or freedoms of a person must be infringed before he or she will be
ensured standing before the court. Perhaps any infringement of a specific
provision of the Charter will allow for standing. On the other hand, perhaps
the infringement not only must violate a specific provision of the Charter,
but also must fail to satisfy the test under section 1. In other words,
the court may refuse standing to a person unless he or she can show
that there has been a significant infringement of his or her rights. This
71 P. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1985) at 693.
72 Supra, note 2.
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latter approach, which is the more restrictive one, has been followed
in the United States. It is known as the doctrine of 'justiciability'.73
Although the doctrine of justiciability has been subsumed under the
general head of standing, it raises some distinct issues. When the United
States courts consider justiciability, they engage in a balancing test that
considers the nature of the constitutional rights that have been infringed
and the extent of the infringement, together with the potential effect
that a decision would have on the body subjected to review. In this respect,
the doctrine is akin to the type of analysis required under section 1
of the Canadian Charter and, therefore, will be addressed in the discussion
of the limitation of Charter rights.
D. Court of Competent Jurisdiction
A person who seeks standing under section 24(1) of the Charter
must apply to a "court of competent jurisdiction" in order to obtain
a just and appropriate remedy. This gives rise to the initial issue of which
court has jurisdiction to decide a question under the Charter: a civil
court, a military tribunal, or both.
In most cases, the constitutional question will be raised initially in
the court of original jurisdiction. This means that persons who are before
a military tribunal must first bring an application under section 24(1)
of the Charter before that tribunal. If the military tribunal is held to
be the only court that has jurisdiction over military personnel who are
brought before the tribunal and who raise a Charter issue, the consequences
will be far reaching. As a specialized court, the military tribunal will
not have experience in dealing with constitutional issues, and will clearly
be reluctant to place limits on its own statutory powers. Of course, the
party raising the Charter issue before a court martial will have a right
to appeal to the civilian Court Martial Appeal Court, but the grounds
of appeal will be limited to the sentence and questions of law.7 4 The
factual determination by the military tribunal in the first instance may
very well decide the issue.
73 The doctrine of justiciability determines whether a party litigant has standing to bring an
application under the Charter, not on the traditional basis as to whether the plaintiff has an interest
in the law suit, but rather on the nature of the law suit. Justiciability is a threshold test used by
the Courts to determine whether it is appropriate for the Court to hear a case. The following
factors are considered: whether there is a cause of action, whether the action is within thejurisdiction
of the Court, whether it was brought within the limitation period, and whether the action raises
any legal question and is appropriate for judicial resolution. Focusing on this latter factor, the
U.S. Courts have only granted standing where the party litigant can show that there has been
a significant infringement of his or her rights. This approach has been adopted by lower federal
Courts in the U.S. in military cases. See Mindes v. Seaman, infra, note 175 and accompanying
discussion.
74 National Defence Act, supra, note 4, s. 197.
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In my opinion, section 24(1) of the Charter should not be given
such a narrow application in matters of military law. Clearly, the civil
court having general jurisdiction is competent to decide a Charter issue,
even when it is brought by a full-time member of the Armed Forces
regarding a matter of military law. In fact, the civil court is the preferred
jurisdiction given the nature of the claim, which is to consider limits
to the powers of the military tribunal, and given the experience of the
civil courts in deciding issues under the Charter.
Section 19 8 of the National Defence Act explicitly preserves the rights
of service personnel under the law of Canada. This includes rights under
the common law, specific statutory rights, and rights as guaranteed under
the Charter. Therefore, it is arguable that any member of the Armed
Forces whose rights as guaranteed by the Charter have been infringed
or denied may apply to either a competent civil court or a military tribunal
under section 24(1) of the Charter.
The second issue raised under section 24(1) of the Charter is the
range of remedies that are available to the court. The court may apply
a number of defensive remedies, which have traditionally been used,
such as dismissing a charge, quashing a conviction, ordering a stay on
proceedings, or declaring that a law is of "no force or effect." In addition,
the court may exercise a broad range of 'affirmative remedies', 75 that
is, the court can order that positive action be taken by the Department
of National Defence or an official from that Department, in order to
remedy the breach of the Charter's provision.
However, before considering the possible remedies that are available
under the Charter, one must first determine whether military law infringes
or denies the rights or freedoms as guaranteed by the Charter.
IV. MILITARY LAW AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
While I would argue that there are many provisions of the Charter
that are infringed by the military legal system,76 the discussion that follows
will consider only one: does a trial before a military tribunal deny service
personnel the right to a "fair and public hearing by an independent and
impartial tribunal," as guaranteed by section 11(d) of the Charter? I will
examine this question, first by outlining the nature of the military legal
75 Hogg, supra, note 71 at 697ff.
76 For example, it can be argued that a separate system of military justice violates the equality
provision, s. 15 of the Charter. The procedures of military discipline could be challenged under
s. 7, the right to "life, liberty and security of the person." Where a military person is confined
to base, barracks, or detention, it might contravene s. 9, the right not to be "arbitrarily detained
or imprisoned." Also, with the exception of s. 1 l(f) the remainder of s. 11 is applicable to the
military.
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system, and then by examining aspects of that system in the context
of section 11 (d) of the Charter.
A separate military system of justice has been in existence since
William the Conqueror established the Court of Chivalry shortly after
1066 A.D.77 The object of this separate system of justice is the complete
discipline of military personnel. Within the military judicial system,justice
was a secondary matter to the discipline and efficiency of the armed
forces, with the success of the military enterprise being the ultimate goal.
Military justice in Canada is administered at two procedural levels: by
summary trial or by court martial. The summary trial is held under the
authority of, or presided over by, the accused's Commanding Officer.78
It is a somewhat informal and expeditious means of dealing with relatively
minor offences under the Code of Service Discipline. Only persons below
the rank of Warrant Officer or an Officer Cadet may be tried by the
Commanding Officer.79 Over 90 percent of the cases under military
jurisdiction are dispensed with in this fashion.
Under the summary trial procedure, the presiding officer, the trier
of fact, and the prosecutor are one and the same person. The accused
is entitled to the aid of an assisting officer, often of his or her own
choice,8o but is not entitled to legal counsel.8' The accused has no right
of appeal from the judgment of the presiding officer.
The powers of punishment of the Commanding Officer under the
summary trial are extensive.82 With the consent of an "approving
authority,"8 3 the CO can sentence a guilty party to ninety days in detention
barracks. When the accused is below the rank of Corporal, the CO, on
his or her own accord, can impose a sentence of up to thirty days.
Alternatively, the Co can impose a fine of up to 60 percent of a month's
pay, order a reduction in rank in the case of a Non-Commissioned Member,
or impose other more minor punishments.84
77 For documentation of the history of military law see Great Britain War Office, Manual
of Military Law, 4th ed. (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1899); J. Boughey, The Elements of Military
Administration and Military Law, 10th ed. (Yorktown, Surrey: William Webb, 1886).
78 The Queen's Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Forces (Ottawa: Queen's Printer,
looseleaf), c. 108.
79 Ibid art. 108.25.
80 Ibid art. 108.03.
8! Ibid art. 108.03, s. (5)(b).
82 Ibid art. 108.27.
83 National Defence Act, supra, note 4, s. 141(3); QR & 0, ibid art. 108.38. Must be an officer
holding the rank of Brigadier-General or higher, or a Colonel designated by the Minister of National
Defence.
84 Minor punishments would include reprimands, confinement to ship or barracks, extra work
and drill, stoppage of leave, or a caution. [In the Canadian Armed Forces, the term 'Non-Commissioned
Officer' has recently been changed to 'Non-Commisioned Member'.]
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In offences of a more serious nature, or where the punishment likely
to be imposed is detention, reduction in rank, or a fine exceeding $200,
the accused has a right to elect a trial by court martial.85
In the case of a more serious offence, a convening officer may direct
a trial by court martial and the accused is then not entitled to elect
a summary trial. Pursuant to section 143(1) of the National Defence Act,
QR & Os article 111.05 prescribes that the following persons may convene
a court martial:
1. the Minister of National Defence;
2. the Chief of Defence Staff;
3. an officer commanding a command, upon receipt of an application
from a commanding officer; and
4. such other service authorities as the Minister may prescribe or
appoint for that purpose.
When a Commanding Officer does not have jurisdiction to try the accused,
or his or her powers of punishment are inadequate, the Co will refer
the charge to a higher authority: the next superior officer in matters
of discipline. The higher authority may dismiss the charge, proceed with
a summary trial under his or her powers, or proceed with a court martial.
The superior commander may not have the authority to convene a court
martial, in which case he or she will refer the matter to an officer who
does have such authority.
With respect to the procedure followed and the powers of punishment
available, there are significant differences between a summary trial and
a trial by court martial. A court martial has greater powers of punishment
than a summary trial court. At a court martial, the accused has a right
to be represented by legal counsel, civilian or military.86 At a summary
trial, the accused is only entitled to representation by an assisting officer.
The military rules of evidence 87 are applied at a court martial. There
are no formal rules of evidence governing the summary trial. Finally,
following an adverse finding by the court martial, the accused has the
right of appeal regarding sentence or errors of law to the Court Martial
85 QR & 0, supra, note 78, art. 108.31.
86 bi1L art. 111.60 provides that every accused is entitled to have a defending officer or
counsel and an adviser at court martial. The defending officer can be any commissioned officer,
but is normally a qualified lawyer. Counsel can be any barrister or advocate in good standing.
An advisor can be anyone. Legal counsel must be engaged at the accused's own expense.
87 IbiL Appendix XVII contains the Military Rules of Evidence. They are made under the
authority of the Governor-in-Council pursuant to s. 152 of the National Defence Act, supra, note 4.
The Rules of Evidence are very fair and provide adequate protection of the accused's rights with
respect to evidential matters. See A.K. Swainson, "The Rules of Evidence at Courts Martial" (1977)
25 Chitty's LJ. 272, 312, 339; (1978) 26 Chitty's Li. 25, 52, 160, 212,227; and J.B. Fay, "Cana-
dian Military Criminal Law: An Examination of Military Justice" (1975) 23 Chitty's Li. 120,
156, 195, 228. Both writers highly commend the military rules of evidence.
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Appeal Court.88 There is no right of appeal following the summary trial
and no record of the proceeding to form the basis of an objective review.
There are four types of courts martial under Canadian military law:
General Courts Martial, Disciplinary Courts Martial, Special General
Courts Martial, and Standing Courts Martial.
The various forms of courts martial differ with respect to the
composition of the court, powers of punishment, and jurisdiction. The
General Court Martial (GCM) is the court of general jurisdiction for persons
subject to the Code of Service Discipline.89 The court may try any matter
under the Code and pass any sentence except a minor punishment. (A
minor punishment being more suitably handled by a Commanding Officer
at summary trial.)90 The GCM can pass a sentence of death, imprisonment
for two or more years, or lesser punishment. The court is appointed
by the convening authority,9' and consists of not less than five officers
and not more than nine.92 All must be above the rank of Captain. The
President of the Court Martial presides over the proceedings and must
hold the rank of Colonel or above.93 A Judge Advocate must be appointed
to the court in order to officiate,94 determine questions of law or mixed
law and fact as directed by the President, and to advise the court on
matters of law.95 The court need not follow the advice of the Judge
Advocate. A prosecutor, who must be a commissioned officer, is appointed
by the convening authority.96 The prosecutor is normally a military lawyer,
but legal training is not a requirement.
In contrast to the GCM, the Disciplinary Court Martial (DCM) is
more limited in its jurisdiction and powers of punishment. It hasjurisdiction
over any offence under the Code of Service Discipline, but cannot try
88 National Defence Act, ibid s. 197.
89 Ibid s. 144.
90 Minor punishments are prescribed in regulations made by the Governor-in-Council under
the authority of s. 125 of the National Defence Act, ibid QR & 0, supra, note 78, art. 104.13
provides for the following minor punishments: confinement to ship or barracks, extra work and
drill, stoppage of leave, and a caution.
91 Pursuant to s. 143(1) of the National Defence Act, ibid; QR & 0, ibid art. 111.05, the
following persons are "convening authorities" who may convene courts martial: the Minister of
National Defence, the Chief of Defence Staff, an officer in charge of a command upon receipt
of an application from a commanding officer, and other authorities as appointed by the Minister
of National Defence.
92 National Defence Act, ibid s. 145; QR & 0, ibid art. 111.18.
93 National Defence Act, ibid s. 145; see QR & 0, ibid c. 112 for the trial procedure at General
Court Martial.
94 QR & 0, ibid art. 111.22. The Judge Advocate officiates only certain aspects of the court
martial. Ultimate authority regarding the conduct of the trial is vested in the President who may
overrule the Judge Advocate in certain matters including legal advice.
95 National Defence Act, supra, note 4, s. 168; QR & 0, ibid art. 112.06.
96 QR & 0, ibid art. 111.23.
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anyone above the rank of Captain.97 The DCM's powers of punishment
are limited to a maximum of less than two years imprisonment and
the court cannot impose a minor punishment.98 There is no restriction
as to the rank of the officers. The President of the court is to be a
Major or above.99 A Judge Advocate may be appointed, but this is not
a mandatory requirement. 100 The prosecutor must be an officer.'0
The Standing Court Martial (SCM) consists only of the President,
who is an officer who has been a barrister or advocate for more than
three years. 0 2 The court has jurisdiction only over certain offences of
a more minor nature. 0 3 However, the SCM does have jurisdiction over
offences under section 120 of the National Defence Act. A Judge Advocate
is not appointed to a SCM. 104 The prosecutor may be anyone holding
the rank of Corporal or above and the person need not have legal
training. 05 The SCM is the most commonly used form of court martial
in the Canadian Forces.
The Special General Court Martial (SGCM) is a unique form of military
tribunal that is used to try civilians who are subject to the Code of Service
Discipline. These are civilians who participate with a unit of the Canadian
Forces, civilians who are accommodated with a unit, dependents who
accompany military personnel while abroad, and civilians embarked on
a military vessel or aircraft. 06 The court usually consists of a judge of
a superior court in Canada. 0 7 The SGCM follows the rules and procedure
of the GCM, but has limited powers of punishment that are more applicable
to civilians. 108
The finding of the court martial and the sentence are determined
by majority vote. In the case of a death sentence, the court must be
unanimous regarding the sentence, unless the death sentence is mandatory,
in which case the court must be unanimous regarding guilt.109 A sentence
97 Ibid art. 111.35.
98 Ibid, art. 111.36.
99 National Defence Act, supra, note 4, s. 151(2); QR & 0, ibid art. 111.40.
100 National Defence Act, ibid s. 152; QR & 0, ibid art. 111.41.
101 QR & O, ibid art. 111.42.
102 National Defence Act, supra, note 4, s. 154; QR & 0, ibid art. 113.51.
'03 QR & 0, ibid art. 113.565, which lists offences for which a SCM is not to be directed.
104 Ibid art. 113.59.
105 Ibid. art. 113.60.
106 QR & 0, ibid arts 113.01, 102.01, 102.09; National Defence Act, supra, note 4, s. 55(4).
107 National Defence Act, ibid s. 155.
108 QR & 0, supra, note 78, arts 113.04, 104.02. The powers of punishment are limited to
the following: death, imprisonment, and a fine.
109 National Defence Act, supra, note 4, s. 168(5),(6).
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of death must be approved by the Governor-in-Council." 0 The members
of the court vote orally, beginning with the most junior officer and ending
with the most senior. In the case of an even court, the President casts
the deciding vote.' 12
As is evident, the military administers a separate and integrated
system of justice with jurisdiction over service personnel, which distin-
guishes it from the civil system. It remains to be determined whether
or not these distinguishing features infringe the Charter by denying military
personnel the right to a "fair and public hearing before an independent
and impartial tribunal."
In examining the independence and impartiality of a military tribunal,
it is important to distinguish between the court martial and the summary
trial. The summary trial warrants examination because it is the most
common form of military justice.
The Commanding Officer or a delegated officer who presides over
a summary trial must exercise a number of key roles in the course of
the trial. He or she is the judge, the trier of fact, and the prosecutor.
There is no separation of institutional roles to prevent a conflict of interest,
which arises in fulfilling the duties of prosecuting officer and judge. As
prosecutor, the Co has a clear interest in the outcome of the proceedings.
He or she has been briefed prior to the trial by the Regimental Sergeant
Major ' 3 or the Coxswain," 4 who has drafted the charge and conducted
an investigation. The Co has clearly decided that a charge is warranted;
otherwise the matter would not have proceeded to the summary trial.
As judge and trier of fact, the CO must keep an open mind and must
objectively weigh the evidence presented. There are clear conflicts of
interest. Furthermore, the Co's major interest is in maintaining unit
efficiency. That is his or her primary duty. The summary trial is a means
of furthering efficiency and not necessarily a means of administering
justice. It is difficult for a Co to adjudicate a case solely on the facts
presented at the proceeding, particularly if he or she commands a small
unit. A Co knows the unit. He or she often knows of the member's
job performance within the unit, and which persons in the unit are the
'bad cats'. The Co becomes well acquainted with those personnel who
repeatedly appear at the summary trial. This knowledge often influences
I 0 Ibid s. 178(1).
111 National Defence Act, ibid s. 168; QR & 0, supra, note 78, art. 112.40.
112 National Defence Act, ibid s. 168; QR & 0, ibid art. 112.49.
113 The Regimental Sergeant Major usually holds the rank of Chief Warrant Officer (First
Class) and is the senior Non-Commissioned Member on the base or within a regiment.
114 The Coxswain usually holds the rank of Chief Petty Officer (First Class) and is the senior
Non-Commissioned Member in a Ship.
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the Co's judgment when it comes to weighing evidence,judging credibility,
and imposing a sentence.
The assisting officer is only of limited help to an accused and, in
most cases, is unable to provide an effective defence. He or she is not
legally trained. The duty of assisting officer is imposed on top of an
already demanding assignment of duties and is often seen as a burden.
Furthermore, it often conflicts with the officer's allegiance to the unit
and to the Commanding Officer. Also, the role of the assisting officer
can be greatly restricted at trial by the presiding officer who controls
the overall proceedings. This same presiding officer is responsible for
the career evaluations of the assisting officer. The assisting officer is
anxious to fulfill the expectations of his or her superior, whatever they
may be.
In conclusion, in spite of the integrity of the officers in the Canadian
Forces, the summary trial process is far from being fair, independent,
and impartial. Given the conflict of duties, Solomon himself could not
possibly maintain the degree of impartiality that is necessary to render
a just judgment at the summary trial.
The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) 1 5 in the United States
provides for a summary court martial that is similar in some respects
to the summary trial under Canadian military law. 16 The summary court
martial is an informal proceeding that is conducted by a single com-
missioned officer and has jurisdiction over enlisted personnel in the U.S.
Armed Forces.117 The presiding officer, who is not the Commanding
Officer of the accused, acts as judge, factfinder, prosecutor, and defense
counsel. In the United States, the accused must consent to trial by summary
court martial; otherwise a trial may be ordered by special or general
court martial. 118 The maximum sentences that may be imposed by
summary court martial are one month's confinement at hard labour,
115 Unifonn Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 801-940 (1970) [hereinafter UCMJ]. Enacted
in 1950, the UCMJ included major reforms of the military justice system. The UCMJ applies to
all armed services in the United States. It was amended by the Military Justice Act of 1968, Pub.
L. No. 90-632 (Oct. 24, 1968) and the Military Justice Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-209 (Dec.
6, 1983). This is the American equivalent of the Canadian Code of Service Discipline
116 The UCMJ ibid provides four methods for disposing of military offences: the general,
special, and summary courts martial and disciplinary punishment pursuant to Art. 15 of the UCMJ.
General court martial is the court of general jurisdiction and can award any punishment including
death. The special court martial is limited to sentences of six months' confinement at hard labour.
Punishment, under Art. 15, is conducted by the accused's CO who can impose up to thirty days'
correctional custody or minor punishments. The summary court martial sentences fall between
those punishments imposed under Art. 15 and those under special court martial.
117 Ibid Art. 20.
118 Ibid Art. 20.
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reduction in rank, and a fine of up to two-thirds of the accused's pay
for one month." 9
In Middendorf v. Henry (1975),120 a class action was brought by
a number of enlisted men of the u.s. Marine Corps, who were charged
with unauthorized absences and other offences. All the men were either
subjected to or ordered to stand trial by summary court martial. In each
instance, the accused requested the assistance of counsel, which was
denied. Consequently, the enlisted men argued that they had been denied
their right to counsel, pursuant to the Fiftht2l and Sixth 22 Amendments
of the U.S. Bill of Rights. They brought an action in District Court seeking
habeas corpus, an injunction against future confinement resulting from
summary court-martial convictions when the assistance of counsel is
denied, and an order vacating the convictions of those who had already
been convicted.
A majority of the United States Supreme Court held that the accused
in a summary court martial has no right to counsel. The Sixth Amendment
does not apply to a summary court martial because it is not a "criminal
prosecution."' 2 3 In the majority opinion, Rehnquist J., as he then was,
emphasized the difference between a summary court martial and a civilian
criminal trial. The charges against the accused have no common law
counterpart and service personnel convicted by summary court martial
do not suffer popular opprobrium as they would following a criminal
conviction. Rehnquist J. stated that the summary court martial is not
adversarial and that the penalties are not comparable to those of a criminal
court. 24
Regarding the Fifth Amendment, Rehnquist J. held that although
a loss of liberty may result, the right to due process does not embody
a right to counsel when a service person is tried by summary court martial.
The majority held that the Court must defer to the determination by
Congress that counsel should not be provided for this type of proceeding
and that to provide counsel would convert a brief informal hearing into
a time-consuming process that would waste the resources of the military. 25
119 Ibid Art. 20.
120 425 U.S. 25.
121 The Fifth Amendment of the American Bill of Rights provides, in part, that "no person
... shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
122 The Sixth Amendment provides, in part, that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right ... to have the assistance of counsel for his defence."
123 Supra, note 120 at 33-34.
124 Ibid at 34-40.
125 Ibid at 43.
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Canadian decisions have adopted a similar approach to that of the
U.S. Supreme Court majority in Middendorf v. Henry and have char-
acterized the summary trial as a disciplinary rather than a criminal
proceeding. In R v. Robertson,26 a member of the Canadian Forces elected
to be tried by summary trial and requested the right to civilian counsel.
The Commanding Officer denied the request, and exercised his discretion
to have the accused tried by court martial. Robertson argued that he
was entitled to be represented by civilian counsel at his summary trial,
pursuant to section 10(b) of the Charter. The Court Martial Appeal Court
held that section 10(b) was not applicable to proceedings by summary
trial. In the Court's opinion, the right to counsel pursuant to the Charter
applies only in respect of the loss of liberty through arrest or detention
itself.
The Court Martial Appeal Court in Robertson, like the United States
Supreme Court in Middendorf v. Henry, has, in effect, downplayed the
criminal and adversarial element in the summary trial. The result of
the Court Martial Appeal Court's approach is to exclude summary trial
proceedings from the scope of the Charter.
Contrary to the approach of the courts, summary trial proceedings
share a great deal in common with the criminal process. A military
conviction, like one under the criminal law, has considerable consequences
for the career of those persons who are convicted. The main consequence
of both the summary trial and the criminal process is that a conviction
can deprive a person of his or her liberty. This is the fundamental element
that characterizes the process as criminal in nature.
Additional consequences follow a criminal conviction by a civil court.
A record is kept of the conviction and any further proceedings by a
criminal court will take account of the record in imposing an appropriate
sentence. The conviction may also affect the convicted person in his
or her career and social relations because of social disapproval and mistrust
of convicted persons. This, of course, depends largely on the type and
seriousness of the offence for which the person was convicted.
The consequences of a military conviction are similar. Military
convictions are recorded on the member's conduct sheet. In passing a
sentence, the military tribunal will always take note of the conduct sheet.
Furthermore, any conviction has significant consequences for the career
of the member. At the very least, he or she will not advance in his
126 (1983), 9 C.C.C. (3d) 404 (C.M.A.C.).
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or her career. In more serious cases, or after repeated offences, a person
may be released from the service as a result of his or her military record.
127
I would not disagree with the courts' characterization of the summary
trial as a minor, disciplinary proceeding if the Commanding Officer's
powers of punishment were limited to such sanctions as extra work and
drill, confinement to barracks, or stoppage of leave. However, this is
not the case. The Commanding Officer has powers of punishment that
include up to ninety days' detention. A sentence of thirty days' impri-
sonment in detention barracks, which the Commanding Officer can order
without approval, 128 is not uncommon. In fact, the sentences assessed
following a summary trial are very much in keeping with those of the
Provincial Court (Criminal Division) or in criminal cases where the Crown
proceeds by summary conviction rather than by indictment. 29 Yet, no
one is about to characterize summary conviction proceedings as dis-
ciplinary rather than criminal in nature.
In my opinion, any proceeding in which a person's liberty can be
denied for a period of up to ninety days is a criminal proceeding. This
is what distinguishes military proceedings from disciplinary proceedings
of an administrative nature. In matters before the Law Society of Upper
Canada, the College of Physicians and Surgeons, and even certain police
tribunals, 130 the various disciplinary bodies do not have the power to
sentence their members to detention.
A strict reading of section 11 of the Charter sheds some doubt on
the distinction that the courts make between military and civil offences.
The rights in section 11 are guaranteed to "any person charged with
an offence." 'Offence' is not limited to criminal offence per se. In fact,
section 1 1(f) specifically excludes persons charged with "offences under
military law" from the right to trial by jury. By implication then, the
word 'offence' in section 11 must mean both military and civil offences;
otherwise, section 11 (f) of the Charter would not make sense.
127 Under the UCMJ convicted personnel in more serious offences are given a dishonourable
discharge. See for example, Parker v. Levy (1974), 417 U.S. 733. In the Canadian Forces, "dismissal
with disgrace," pursuant to s. 125 of the National Defence Act, supra, note 4 or "dismissal," pursuant
to QR & 0, supra, note 78, art. 104.07 are very severe sentences and are not often imposed.
However, an administrative dismissal under Category 5(B) for misconduct is common. It is initiated
by the accused's CO in more serious cases or for a repeat offender. See QR & 0, art. 15.36.
128 QR & 0, ibid art. 108.27.
129 Under s. 722 of the Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, the maximum punishment
for a summary conviction offence is a $500 fine or six months' imprisonment or both.
130 Under s. 36 of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act, supra, note 26 a member of
the RCMP can be subjected to one year's imprisonment, for a major offence. For a minor offence,
the maximum sentence is confinement to barracks for thirty days. Under the Regulations to the
Police Act of Ontario, R.R.O. 1980, 0. Reg. 791, s. 52, the maximum punishment for a major
offence is dismissal. Members of police forces governed under provincial statute cannot be sentenced
to imprisonment.
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In conclusion, the summary trial process is analogous to the criminal
process in many respects. The fundamental right to liberty, sacrosanct
under the common law and guaranteed by the Charter, is at stake. For
this reason, the accused at a criminal trial and the accused at a military
trial are equally deserving of a "fair and public hearing before an
independent and impartial tribunal."
The court-martial process is much more formal than the summary
trial. Therefore, the accused benefits from the procedural protections that
are offered and the process is not haunted by the obvious conflicts of
interest that confront the Commanding Officer under the summary trial.
Nevertheless, I submit that it is neither independent nor impartial.
The President of the court martial is always a senior ranking military
officer. He or she may or may not have legal training. The court martial
is composed entirely of commissioned officers. Only in the case of a
Disciplinary Court Martial is there a requirement that the President be
legally trained and, in this case, the court martial consists only of the
one officer. In other cases, it is unlikely that the members of the court
martial will be legally trained. When a Judge Advocate is appointed
to the court martial, his or her role is to advise the court on matters
of law, although the advice may be disregarded. Finally, the prosecuting
officer is often legally trained. All the key participants in the trial are
commissioned officers in the Canadian Forces.
The distinction between officers and other personnel in the service
is fundamental. They are totally segregated from one another, housed
in separate quarters, and fed in separate messes. There is rarely any
social mixing between officers and other service personnel and, in those
rare situations that allow it, there is strict control of the social function.
After years of training, officers are indoctrinated with values of duty,
discipline, and the goal of military efficiency. These values clearly prevail
in the military tribunal as the officers consider the cases before them.
In the United States, Congress has recognized the dominant officer
influence in the court-martial process and has, therefore, provided for
limited participation on the court bench by enlisted persons. However,
this is provided only when requested by the accused, and the enlisted
persons, all of whom are senior non-commissioned members, form a
minority of the court.' 3'
In cases dealing with the jurisdiction of military law, the United
States' courts acknowledge that the military legal process is institutionally
inadequate to safeguard the constitutional rights of service personnel.
131 UCMJ, supra, note 115, Art. 25; See US. v. Crawford(1964), 15 U.S.C.M.A. 31.
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However, the courts recognize that this is necessary to some extent to
maintain military efficiency. This approach is an honest one. It acknowl-
edges that members of the U.S. military sacrifice their rights in the name
of service to their country and it recognizes the deficiencies in the military
legal system.
Realizing the inadequacies of the military system, the United States
Supreme Court, in a series of decisions, has narrowed the scope of military
jurisdiction. In the first case, Toth v. Quarles (1955),132 a former airman
who was honourably discharged was arrested at his civilian home in
Pittsburgh for charges of murder and conspiracy committed while on
service in Korea. Although he had no relationship with the military at
the time of his arrest, he was taken to Korea to stand trial before a
court martial. 133 The u.s. Supreme Court held that the act was uncon-
stitutional and beyond Congress's powers under Article I of the U.S.
Constitution to "make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the
land and naval Forces."
Black J., writing for the Court, recognized that:
The trial of soldiers to maintain discipline is merely incidental to the army's primary
fighting function.... And conceding to all military personnel that high degree
of honesty and sense of justice that nearly all of them undoubtedly have, it still
remains true that military tribunals have not been and probably never can be
constituted in such a way that they can have the same qualifications that the
Constitution has deemed essential to fair trials of civilians in federal court.
1 34
In particular, Black J. emphasized the fact that those who exercise judicial
functions in military trials are appointed by military commanders, do
not have life tenure, and may be removed at will. Black J. concluded:
There are dangers in military trials which were sought to be avoided by the Bill
of Rights and Article III of our Constitution. Free countries of the world have
tried to restrict military tribunals to the narrowest jurisdiction deemed absolutely
essential to maintaining discipline among troops in active service.
135
The United States Supreme Court, therefore, held that Article 3(a) of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice is unconstitutional and that Congress
cannot subject civilians like Toth to trial by court martial. Like all civilians,
Toth is entitled to the benefit of safeguards that are afforded those in
the civil courts and that are authorized by Article III of the Constitution.
In another case, which dealt with the jurisdiction of military law
over civilians accompanying service personnel abroad, the U.S. Supreme
132 350 U.S. I 1.
133 The military assumed jurisdiction pursuant to UCMJ, supra, note 115, Art. 3(a).
134 Supra, note 132 at 17.
135 Ibid at 22.
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Court held that a trial by court martial did not meet the requirements
of Article II, section 2136 or the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the
Constitution. In Reid v. Covert (1957), 137 Mrs. Clarice Covert was con-
victed by a court martial of murdering her husband, an airforce sergeant
whom she had accompanied to England. Mrs. Covert was sentenced
to life imprisonment. She was held in custody pending a re-trial, which
was ordered by the Court of Military Appeals, because of an error
concerning her defence of insanity. While in custody, Mrs. Covert
petitioned the District Court for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground
that the Constitution prohibited her trial by military authorities. In spite
of the fact that no U.S. court had extra-territorial jurisdiction over Mrs.
Covert, the Supreme Court granted habeas corpus and ordered that she
be set free.
Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion for the majority of the Court.
The decision recognized that the emphasis in the military has been to
maintain obedience and fighting fitness and, consequently, there has been
less emphasis in protecting the rights of service personnel. Black J. pointed
out that "Courts-martial are typically adhoc bodies appointed by a military
officer from among his subordinates. They have always been subject
to varying degrees of 'command influence'."' 138
Despite recent statutory reforms to the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, which granted some protection to the accused, Black J. concluded
that the system precludes the necessary constitutional safeguards for a
fair trial in the civil courts. He said:
In part this is attributable to the inherent differences in values and attitudes that
separate military society from civilian society. In the military, by necessity, emphasis
must be placed on the security and order of the group rather than the value and
integrity of the individual.
139
In concluding that military tribunals violate principles of fairness
and impartiality, the United States Court has adopted a 'structural
approach'. In other words, the process under military law has been
structured in such a way that it cannot possibly exclude subtleties of
command influence and higher military values such as the need for
discipline.
136 Art. II, s. 2 provides that "The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment,
shall be by Jury...."
137 354 U.S. 1. The case was consolidated with an appeal by Mrs. Dorothy Smith in the
U.S. Supreme Court. She too was convicted by court martial of killing her husband, an Army
Officer stationed in Japan, and sentenced to life imprisonment.
138 Ibid at 36.
139 Ibid at 39.
19861
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
In Canada, the Code of Service Discipline applies to civilians, pursuant
to section 55(1) of the National Defence Act, which includes civilian
dependents who accompany service personnel abroad. 140 Therefore, as
was the case in Reid v. Covert, a crime committed by a dependent could
be tried under Canadian military law. Section 55(1) of the NationalDefence
Act has yet to be considered by the civil courts.
The Code of Service Discipline also applies to ex-service personnel
in Canada for service offences committed while the former personnel
were on active service. Pursuant to section 55(2) of the National Defence
Act, persons who have been released from the Canadian Forces can
be arrested by the military authorities and subjected to trial by court
martial for past offences. This is precisely what happened in Toth v.
Quarles.
As the decision in Toth indicates, the courts are reluctant to allow
the jurisdiction of military law to extend to civilians. In such cases, the
civil courts have been quick to point out the structural inadequacies of
the military system of justice.
The civil courts have exhibited greater reluctance to uphold con-
stitutional rights when the case has involved the application of military
law to active service personnel. Consequently, in both Canada and the
United States, the courts have had difficulty in resolving the issue of
the jurisdiction of military tribunals with respect to civil offences.
In both Canada and the United States, active service members of
the armed forces have been subject to military law for offences prohibited
by the general criminal law. Under section 120 of the National Defence
Act, Canadian service personnel can be tried for offences prohibited by
the Criminal Code, or any other federal statute, except for the offences
of murder, manslaughter, or sexual assault. In the United States, offences
under the general criminal law are incorporated into various provisions
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. For example, Article 120 of
the Code makes rape or carnal knowledge a crime under U.S. military
law.
Prior to O'Callahan v. Parker (1969),141 in the United States, the
question of court-martial jurisdiction depended entirely on the status of
the accused. The O'Callahan case introduced another factor: the nature
of the offence. In that case, a sergeant in the U.S. Army who was stationed
in Hawaii was convicted of assault and attempted rape. While on an
evening pass, he broke into a hotel room, and assaulted and attempted
to rape a young woman. The accused was convicted by court martial,
140 National Defence Act, supra, note 4, s. 55(4)(c).
141 395 U.S. 258.
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sentenced to ten years' imprisonment at hard labour, and given a
dishounorable discharge.
While in confinement at Lewisburg Penitentiary, Sergeant O'Cal-
lahan filed a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court. He submitted
that the court martial was without jurisdiction to try him for non-military
offences committed off military property while on an evening pass.
O'Callahan's petition was denied. On appeal to the United States Supreme
Court, the majority granted the petition and held that in order for an
offence to be under military jurisdiction it must be "service con-
nected." In O'Callahan's case, the court found that there was "no connec-
tion - not even the remotest one" - between O'Callahan's military
duties and the crimes in question.142 In reaching its conclusion, the major-
ity recited the "dangers lurking in military trials,"'143 and the fact that
military justice has failed to preserve important constitutional guaran-
tees.' 44 The Court stressed the general principle in Toth v. Quarles
(1955), 145 that the authority of military law must be limited to "the least
possible power adequate to the end proposed."'
46
The service-connected test, which was applied in O'Callahan v.
Parker, was affirmed and expanded in another U.S. Supreme Court decision,
Relford v. Commandant (197 1). 147 In Relord, a corporal on active service
was convicted of kidnapping and rape for two offences that took place
on military property. The Court determined that the service-connected
test required an ad hoc consideration of twelve factors. 48 Considering
those factors in Relford's case, the Court held that the offence was service
connected and denied the application for habeas corpus.
142 Ibid at 273.
143 Ibid. at 298, citing Toth v. Quarles, supra, note 132 at 22-23.
144 Supra, note 298.
145 Supra, note 132.
146 Ibid at 22-23.
147 401 U.S. 355.
148 The twelve factors considered in Relford v. Commandant, ibid were:
1. The service person's proper absence from the base.
2. Commission of the offence away from the base.
3. Commission at a place not under military control.
4. Commission in peacetime and being unrelated to authority stemming from the war power.
5. Commission within U.S. territorial limits and not in occupied zone of a foreign country.
6. Absence of any connection between accused's military duties and crime.
7. Victim not engaged in performance of military duty.
8. Presence and availability of civilian court in which offence can be prosecuted.
9. Absence of any flouting of military authority.
10. Absence of any threat to a military post.
11. Absence of any violation of military property.
12. Offence being among those traditionally prosecuted in civilian courts.
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In safeguarding the rights of service personnel in the United States,
O'Callahan was the high water mark. In Relford, the Supreme Court
itself had been satisfied to apply the service-connected test only on an
ad hoc basis. Since then, the civil courts have all but closed the door
on O'Callahan, and have deferred to the military, permitting the military
court to determine those areas where court-martial jurisdiction is ap-
propriate.149 This is the result of conservatism within both the U.S. Court
of Military Appeals and the Supreme Court. 50 The current trend, which
in my opinion is an unfortunate one, is to allow only limited application
of the Bill of Rights to military personnel.
The Supreme Court of Canada, in MacKay v. The Queen (1980),151
has also had occasion to consider the question of thejurisdiction of military
tribunals over ordinary criminal offences. Rejecting MacKay's claim that
his right to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial
tribunal under section 2(f) of the Canadian Bill of Rights had been violated,
Ritchie J., for the majority, emphasized that the President of the Standing
Court Martial was an officer of considerable rank and experience in
military law. There was no more suitable candidate for President of a
court martial. Focusing entirely on the record of the court-martial
proceeding and ignoring the structural bias inherent in the court-martial
system, Ritchie J. held that "[t]here is no evidence whatever in the record
of the trial to suggest that the president acted in anything but an
independent and impartial manner or that he was otherwise unfitted for
the task to which he was appointed." 152 McIntyre J., in his concurring
opinion, held that despite the close association of the President with the
military community and his identification with military society, the
President was able to adjust his attitude in order to meet the requisite
duty of impartiality.153
Additionally, the Court relied on the appeal procedures under the
National Defence Act, whereby an accused has a right to appeal to the
civilian Court Martial Appeal Court. These provisions, according to the
Court, protect the accused's right to a fair trial.
In his dissenting judgment, Laskin CJ.C. adopted a structural approach
and held that the Standing Court Martial had violated the right to a
149 See Schlesinger v. Councilman (1975), 420 U.S. 738; N.G. Cooper, "O'Callahan Revisited:
Severing the Service Connection" (1977) 76 Mil. L. Rev. 165.
150 See C. Goodrich, "Denying Soldiers the Rights They Fight to Protect" (Nov. 1982) 2
Cal. Lawyer 49 at 50.
151 Supra, note 40.
152 Ibid at 403.
153 Ibid at 404.
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fair trial before an independent tribunal, pursuant to section 2(f) of the
Canadian Bill of Rights.
Needless to say, there is no impugning of the integrity of the presiding officer,
it is just that he is not suited, by virtue of his close involvement with the entire
military establishment to conduct a trial on charges of a breach of the ordinary
law.'
54
Laskin CJ.C. pointed out, correctly in my opinion, that the adjudicator's
familiarity with the service is irrelevant. MacKay was charged with an
offence under the Narcotic ControlAct 55 No matter how much experience
the President had in military matters, this would not have better equipped
him to adjudicate a trafficking offence than a civilian judge. In fact,
as Professor Gold aptly pointed out in his critique of the MacKay decision,
if the President were influenced by the special needs of the military,
that would clearly violate the accused's right to a fair trial, at least with
respect to the elements of the offence and the defences available. 56
The majority and concurring judgments in the MacKay case applied
the wrong test of fairness and impartiality under section 2(f) of the Bill
of Rights. The test employed in the area of administrative law, under
a long line of authority, determines whether the circumstances of the
case give rise to a "reasonable apprehension of bias" - not whether
the tribunal was in fact biased.' 57 In reviewing decisions by administrative
tribunals, the guiding principle is not that justice is done, but rather that
justice is seen to be done. 58
This is exactly what concerned the Chief Justice in his dissenting
opinion in the MacKay case. Laskin CJ.C. pointed out that the accused
was "in the hands" of his military superiors throughout the whole legal
process. The charges were laid by MacKay's Commanding Officer. The
Standing Court Martial was ordered by a senior commander. Pursuant
to section 154 of the National Defence Act, a Lieutenant-Colonel was
appointed as the Standing Court Martial from an approved list of legally
trained officers. Finally, both the President of the Standing Court Martial
and the prosecutor were from the office of the Judge Advocate General
and were commissioned officers in the Canadian Forces. In making the
following remarks, Laskin CJ.C. aptly pointed out that his concern with
the military system is the appearance of impartiality:
154 Ibid at 421.
155 Supra, note 51.
156 Gold, supra, note 64 at 140-41.
157 Committee for Justice and Liberty v. National Energy Board (1976), [1978] 1 S.C.R. 369;
R v. PickersgiI Ex P. Smith (1970), 14 D.L.R. (3d) 717 (Man. Q.B.).
158 Metropolitan Properties v. Lannon (1968), [1969] 1 Q.B. 577, 599 (C.A.), Denning M.R.
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In my opinion, it is fundamental that when a person, any person, whatever his
or her status or occupation, is charged with an offence under the ordinary criminal
law and is to be tried under that law and in accordance with its prescriptions,
he or she is entitled to be tried before a court ofjustice, separate from the prosecution
and free from any suspicion of influence of or dependency on others.' 59
The majority opinion suggested that the right of appeal to a civilian
court guarantees that the court martial will act fairly and impartially.
Clearly, this position is untenable. The fairness and impartiality of the
appeal tribunal are a very separate matter from the fairness exhibited
by the trial court itself. One reason to separate the two is that the right
of appeal under sections 195 and 197 of the National Defence Act is
limited to questions of law. The appeal court will not interfere unless
there is a serious error of law, or the finding of fact is unreasonable
and cannot be supported by the evidence presented. 160 A second reason
is that the appeal court, in reviewing the trial record and in considering
the submissions on appeal, may not detect the subtle ways in which
the military system influences the decision.
MacKay v. The Queen is the leading Canadian case involving the
rights of military personnel. It has been followed on a number of occasions
by lower courts, when considering decisions involving the Charter. In
my opinion, however, MacKay should not be followed in determining
whether the military system ofjustice infringes section 11 (d) of the Charter.
A number of recent decisions of the Court Martial Appeal Court
have followed MacKay in considering the jurisdiction of a military tribunal
over criminal offences brought under military law pursuant to section
120 of the National Defence Act. 161 The Court also considered the Charter
in these cases, but to date none of the service personnel have challenged
the military legal system through section 11 (d). Nevertheless, the reasoning
in these cases provides some insight into the nature of judicial review
by the Court Martial Appeal Court, and may reflect the approach of
the Court should there be a major challenge to military jurisdiction under
the Charter.
Two of the decisions involve drug offences. In R v. MacDonald62
the accused service person was convicted by Standing Court Martial
of trafficking in narcotics contrary to the Narcotic Control Act.163 He
159 Supra, note 40 at 402.
160 Gold, supra, note 64 at 141.
161 Section 120 of the National Defence Act, supra, note 4 incorporates into military law
any act or omission punishable under the Criminal Code or any other statute of the Parliament
of Canada. Persons subject to the Code of Service Discipline who commit civil offences can be
tried by a service tribunal pursuant to s. 120.
162 (1983), 150 D.L.R. (3d) 620 (C.M.A.C.).
163 Supra, note 51.
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had sold three 'joints' for five dollars to another member at a civilian
establishment while both were off duty. The Court Martial sentenced
MacDonald to six months' imprisonment.
In determining the sentence, the Standing Court Martial applied a
general principle that trafficking requires some form of incarceration.
As one ground of appeal, MacDonald argued that the sentence was so
severe in the circumstances that it was illegal. In dismissing the argument,
President Mahoney held:
While the principle that "trafficking requires some form of incarceration" may
be a wrong principle to be applied by a civil court, it is not necessarily a wrong
principle to be applied by a military court in sentencing. In addition to the
considerations dictating the proper principles of sentencing in the civil courts, there
is an overriding disciplinary consideration to be taken into account by courts martial.
Indeed, that disciplinary consideration is a major reason for the existence of a
separate system of military law and separate courts to administer it. I am not
prepared to hold that the determination that a trafficking conviction under military
law requires some incarceration is illegal.164
Another argument raised by MacDonald was that trafficking was
not a military offence, and therefore his right to a trial by jury under
section 11 (f) of the Charter had been violated. Section 1 (f) states that
a right to a jury trial does not extend to offences under military law.
The Court Martial Appeal Court dismissed this ground of appeal and
held that the offence came within the ambit of military law, as it fell
within the letter of section 120(1) of the National Defence Act and had
a real military nexus. Therefore section 1 l(f) was not applicable.
President Mahoney stated that "illegal drug use by service personnel
entails obvious and serious disciplinary considerations." He concluded:
The connection between drug use and the user's performance of his or her military
duties is clear. The right, indeed duty, of the military command to deal with drug
use and the concomitant trafficking and possession by military personnel is likewise
clear.
Where and when service personnel acquire or use illegal drugs, whether off
or on base, off or on duty, is of little moment. The effect of its use is the basis
of the disciplinary concern. Wherever the drug is bought or used, it is entirely
reasonable to expect that its effects will be manifested on duty. A military nexus
is present in the circumstances of this appeal.'
65
While the connection between military jurisdiction over drug offences
and military discipline may be clear to President Mahoney, it is not at
all clear to me. As with McIntyre J. in MacKay v. The Queen,166 he upheld
164 Supra, note 162 at 622.
165 Ibd at 626.
166 Supra, note 40.
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the jurisdiction of the military tribunal in the name of discipline without
any proof that drug use affected discipline one way or the other.
In R v. MacEachern (1985),167 the accused was convicted of
possession of marijuana and sentenced under military law to a fine of
$1,000 and thirty days' detention. The drug was found by military police
while MacEachern was on leave at his home located several hundred
miles from his ship. The Court Martial Appeal Court dismissed Mac-
Eachem's challenge to the jurisdiction of the Standing Court Martial.
Addy J. applied the 'military nexus test' and held that there was a sufficient
nexus between the consequences of the offence and the interests of the
military. Again, the Court took official notice of the fact that drug offences
detrimentally affect discipline, morale, and efficiency. The Court also
failed to consider whether or not the civil courts could be equally effective
in dealing with the problem, particulary in light of the fact that most
military drug offenders are discharged from the service once they have
served their sentence.
The military nexus test was again applied by the Court Martial
Appeal Court in R v. Catuda168 and R v. Sullivan.169 In Catudal, the
accused member of the Armed Forces was charged with nine counts
of unlawfully setting fires. Eight of the offences occurred on a military
base, and on that basis the Court held that there was a sufficient military
nexus to grant the General Court Martial. However, in one instance,
the accused set fire to a motel while travelling to a new posting. There
was no military nexus in the case of this incident and it was not an
offence under military law. The Court Martial Appeal Court held,
therefore, that the offence was not within the jurisdiction of the General
Court Martial and quashed Catudal's conviction with respect to that count.
In Sullivan, the accused soldier was convicted on five counts of gross
indecency with teenage boys. All the offences took place at the accused's
quarters located at Canadian Forces Base Gagetown, and four of the
five boys were children of service personnel. After pleading guilty to
each of the charges before the military tribunal, Sullivan was ordered
to leave the Court, and the Judge Advocate advised the tribunal as to
sentencing in the accused's absence. When the Court reconvened, Sullivan
was sentenced to four years on each count, to be served concurrently.
Sullivan appealed the conviction on the ground that the Court Martial
did not have jurisdiction over the offences in question, since they were
offences under the Criminal Code. The Court Martial Appeal Court upheld
167 63 N.R. 59 (C.M.A.C.).
168 (1985), 63 N.R. 58 (C.M.A.C.).
169 (1986), 65 N.R. 48 (C.M.A.C.).
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the conviction and held that the service member was triable in military
court because there was a real military nexus or service connection to
the offence. It offended the morale and discipline of the service by striking
deeply at the integrity of the military establishment.
On another ground, Sullivan challenged the legality of his sentence
under the Charter. He argued that he was denied fundamental justice
as guaranteed by section 7170 by not being permitted to be present when
the Judge Advocate addressed the Court on the principles of sentencing.
Because the soldier had been denied his fundamental rights, and because
the sentence imposed was too long, the Court Martial Appeal Court
ordered that Sullivan be discharged under section 24(1) of the Charter.
He had served one year of his sentence.
The recent decisions of the Court Martial Appeal Court indicate
a common trend. First, the cases apply the military nexus test, and it
has generally been accepted that a military tribunal has jurisdiction only
where the offence is military connected, and has a real effect on the
morale, discipline, and efficiency of the Armed Forces. Second, in the
case of drug offences, and also in the case of the gross indecency offences
committed by Sullivan, the Court Martial Appeal Court assumed that
the offence in question was detrimental to morale, discipline, and efficiency
without actual proof of that fact. Finally, the cases indicate that some
challenges under the Charter by military personnel have been successful,
and have not been limited by section 1 of the Charter. However, to date
no service member has based a challenge on section 1 l(d), which
guarantees the right to a fair hearing before an independent and impartial
tribunal.
Under the Charter, the courts must examine the appearance of justice
in the military system and employ the structural test of fairness and
impartiality. Applying this test, the structure of the military system of
justice clearly violates section 1 l(d) of the Charter and should be subject
only to the specific limitation provided under section 1.
Although the United States' courts have been critical of the military
judicial process when it has extended its jurisdiction to civilians, these
same courts and the Court Martial Appeal Court have displayed con-
siderable restraint when the accused is a full-time member of the regular
forces. This is where the principle of military necessity begins to water
down the criticism made by the civil courts of the military judicial process.
Surely the civil courts must recognize that if the military system is unfair
to civilians, it is equally unfair to service personnel. However, these courts
have been reluctant to intervene and uphold the rights of military personnel
170 Supra, note 2.
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because it is believed that the military system of justice is necessary
for the maintenance of discipline. In effect, the civil courts have placed
a limitation on the application of constitutional rights to members of
the Armed Forces. Are these limitations appropriate under section 1 of
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms?
V. THE LIMITATION OF RIGHTS
Section 1 of the Charter provides that:
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms
set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 17'
In considering the application of the Charter to military law, the difficult
question is not whether the military system infringes on the rights of
its personnel, but rather whether the infringement is justified given the
essential role of the military. This calls on the court to balance the
fundamental rights of individuals against the undesirability of judicial
intervention in the military system.
Depending on the legal policy adopted, the court could develop one
of four possible doctrines under the limiting provision of the Charter
the doctrine of military immunity, the doctrine of justiciability, the sepa-
rate community doctrine, or the least restrictive means test.
The least activist approach that could be adopted is the doctrine
of military immunity. Under this approach, the military would be immune
from the application of the Charter. The courts would recognize that
the military system offends the Charter, but would refuse to intervene
into military affairs. In the matter of the rights of service personnel,
the courts would defer to Parliament and the military hierarchy.
The approach adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in MacKay
v. The Queen 72 is, in my opinion, very close to the doctrine of military
immunity. Once the matter in MacKay was found to be within the
jurisdiction of Parliament and the military, the Court, under the valid
federal objective test, would not make further inquiries. In MacKay, there
was no review of the rights asserted and, therefore, the military was
virtually immune from review under the Bill of Rights. 73
171 Ibd
172 Supra, note 40.
173 Of course, there would be some review even under the valid federal objective test. For
example, if provisions of the National Defence Act, supra, note 4, or the actions of military authorities
discriminated against blacks, this would be considered as invalid, and having no rational connection
to the federal objective of maintaining a disciplined and efficient armed forces.
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Employing the military immunity doctrine, the Court takes judicial
notice of the need for a separate system of military law in the name
of military efficiency. At the trial level in the MacKay case, Cattanach
J. put it this way:
Without a Code of Service Discipline, the armed forces could not discharge the
function for which they were created.... To function efficiently as a force there
must be prompt obedience to all lawful orders of superiors, concern, support for
and concerted action with their comrades and a reverence for and a pride in
the traditions of the service. All members embark upon rigorous training to fit
themselves physically and mentally for the fulfillment of the role they have chosen
and paramount in that there must be rigid adherence to discipline.'
74
The doctrine of military immunity leaves the important task of
safeguarding the rights of service personnel entirely to Parliament and
military authorities. Given that the main concern of these bodies is military
discipline and efficiency, this is tantamount to placing the Charter, as
it applies to members of the military, on a sacrificial altar.
In the United States, military activities have always, at least to some
extent, been open to review under the Bill of Rights. The courts have
exhibited various doctrinal approaches over the years. During the 1950s
and 60s, when the ideological leaning of the U.S. Supreme Court was
more liberal, the Court was very critical of the military judicial system
and readily intervened to safeguard the rights of service personnel. On
the other hand, the recent trend has been toward conservatism, and in
the U.S. Supreme Court, as well as among the Circuit Courts, there has
been a reluctance to interfere in military matters. The Circuit Courts
have been the most deferential and have employed the doctrine of
justiciability to the review of cases involving the military. The United
States Supreme Court has been less hesitant and has at least considered
the alleged violation of the Bill of Rights. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
has employed the separate community doctrine, which subjects the military
to a lesser degree of constitutional scrutiny than would be the case for
other matters within the authority of the federal government.
The doctrine of justiciability is used not as a means of limiting
the constitutional rights of service personnel but, rather, as a means of
preventing judicial review of certain military claims. The lower federal
courts claim to have received little guidance from the U.S. Supreme Court
regarding when review of a military case is appropriate. Consequently,
the 1971 decision of the Court of Appeal of the Fifth Circuit, Mindes
v. Seaman,175 has been very influential in determining the threshold
174 Re Mackay and the Queen; Re Kevany and the Queen (1977), 36 C.C.C. (2d) 522 (F.C.T.D.)
at 524.
175 453 F.2d. 197 (5th Cir.).
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standards of reviewability. Although Mindes v. Seaman has never been
approved by the u.s. Supreme Court, it is followed in eight judicial circuits,
leaving only two circuits that have not adopted the Mindes test.176
In Mindes, an Air Force Captain was discharged from active service
and placed in the Reserves after he received an unfavourable career
assessment. Captain Mindes claimed that the discharge was based on
a factually erroneous report and he was, therefore, denied due process
of law under the Fifth Amendment. The Mindes discharge was affirmed
by the Air Force Review Board. He made a further allegation on his
application for review that the Air Force Review Board failed to make
findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by due process.
The Court in Mindes examined a number of cases that considered
military matters and noted that, in some instances, the court proceeded
to review the claim. However, the Court also noted several cases in
which review was not undertaken. The Court attempted to reconcile
these decisions and devised a test for the review of internal military
matters. Following the test, the Court determined whether or not a claim
against the military would be reviewed. A case that failed to meet the
requirements of the test would be found to be non-justiciable and the
civil court would decline to hear the case.
The Court in Mindes stated that a threshold test was necessary in
order to minimize the interference of the civil courts into military affairs.
The civil courts should not second guess actions by military authorities
who have expertise in military affairs. The Court noted that review by
the civil courts should not "stultify the military in the performance of
its vital mission."' 77 The new test proposed by the Court was justified
because it reflected the general reluctance of the civil courts to interfere
with internal military affairs.
Under the Mindes test, a trial court examines the substance of the
constitutional claim in conjunction with the policy reasons behind non-
review of military affairs. The court must balance "several subjective
and interrelated factors":
1. the nature and strength of the plaintiff's claim against the military;
2. the potential injury to the plaintiff if review is refused;
3. the type and degree of anticipated interference with the military function;
and
4. the extent to which the exercise of military expertise or discretion is
involved.
178
176 Dillard v. Brown (1981), 652 F.2d 316 (3d Cir.); Dilley v. Alexander (1979), 603 F.2d
914, 920 (D.C. Cir.). See G.W. Gorenstein, "Judicial Review of Constitutional Claims Against
the Military" (1984) 84 Colum. L. Rev. 387 at 397ff.
177 Supra, note 175 at 199.
178 Ibid at 201-2.
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With respect to the first factor, the Court in Mindes suggested that
constitutional claims would normally merit the attention of the court;
however, when the claim was a tenuous one, such as a claim challenging
a haircut regulation, the matter would not be justiciable.
The Court offered no explanation regarding the weight to be given
to the second consideration. However, the earlier cases considered in
the decision consistently reviewed court-martial convictions, which in
most cases involved deprivation of liberty. However, based on Middendorf
v. Henry,179 the same cannot be said with respect to summary courts
martial, or disciplinary punishment under Article 15 of the Uniform Code
of Military Justice. Perhaps the courts will decline to review 'minor'
disciplinary matters, notwithstanding the potential loss of liberty.
With respect to the third factor, the Court in Mindes stated that
when the type and degree of interference with the military were such
that they would seriously impede the armed forces in the performance
of vital duties, the court would normally refuse to hear the case. However,
this must be weighed along with the other factors.
The final factor calls on the court to defer to military expertise
when the matter involves an exercise of discretion and calls on the superior
knowledge and experience of military authorities.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the District
Court had improperly dismissed Captain Mindes' application without
proper consideration of the above factors. The appeal by Mindes was
allowed and the case remanded to the District Court to apply the proposed
test.
Mindes v. Seaman has been very influential in the United States.
This is unfortunate. In my opinion, the Mindes test offers little guidance
in determining constitutional claims against the military. The test itself
involves vague and meaningless phraseology. The Court in Mindes
suggests a balancing test, yet does not elaborate how this is to be done.
The Court did not even apply the test in the case at bar, but rather
remanded the case to the District Court to apply the test. As a result,
the application of the Mindes test has been totally inconsistent. Often,
the courts have simply quoted the factors verbatim and arrived at a result
without any further discussion. 80 Inevitably, the application of the Mindes
test causes the courts to defer to military expertise and the alleged needs
of the military, at the expense of the constitutional rights of service
personnel. The test is premised on the deference of the civil courts to
179 Supra, note 120.
180 See ben Shalom v. Secretary of the Army (1980), 489 F. Supp. 964, 971 (E.D. Wis.);
Ne Smith v. Fulton (1978), 443 F. Supp. 411, 413 (M.D. Ga.), aff'd (1980), 615 F.2d 196 (5th
Cir.).
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the expert judgment of military authorities. Consequently, a claim by
the military experts that a certain course of action is vital to the military
function is held by the civil courts to be cogent proof of that fact. There
is no onus on the military to lead evidence to establish the relationship
between the challenged course of action and military efficiency. Thus,
courts following Mindes have declined to review a number of claims,
including those involving due process, First Amendment rights, equal
protection, and the right of privacy.
Although Mindes has been followed by a majority of the judicial
circuits in the United States, it has not been adopted by the United States
Supreme Court. The lower courts, therefore, rely primarily on Orloff
v. Willoughly (1953) 81 and, to a lesser extent, on Gilligan v. Morgan
(1973)182 as authority for adoption of the Mindes test. However, neither
case supports the approach taken in Mindes of imposing a threshold test
in the review of constitutional claims against the military. In Orloff, the
u.s. Supreme Court reviewed the constitutional claim by the plaintiff
that under the Doctor's Draft Act,183 he was entitled to a commission
upon his enrolment into the Army. Orloff was declined a commission
and assigned to a low-grade medical position because he failed to disclose
possible membership with subversive organizations upon his enrolment.
The Court held that it was constitutionally permissible for the Army
to exercise its discretion in assignments to personnel and, in so doing,
to consider membership in subversive organizations. Certainly, the
Supreme Court deferred to military discretion in Orloff, but this did not
preclude the Court from considering the plaintiff's claim. The case was
clearly justiciable.
Gilligan v. Morgan is the only case in which the Supreme Court
has refused to review a case because it involved a non-justiciable matter.
This case was brought by students at Kent State following the tragic
confrontation between protesting students and the Ohio National Guard.
The Court declined to hear the case, not because it believed that the
National Guard was immune from judicial review, but rather because
of the peculiar claim for relief brought by the students. The students
did not seek damages for the injuries sustained as a result of the National
Guard's actions, nor did they ask for a restraining order against the
National Guard. The students claimed that the Ohio National Guard
was being trained in such a way that it would inevitably use force in
violation of their due process rights. The relief claimed was that the
181 345 U.S. 83.
182 413 U.S. 1.
183 Universal Military Training and Service Act, 50 U.S.C. App. § 454(i).
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District Court undertake extensive supervision of the National Guard's
training. The Supreme Court dismissed the students' appeal on the ground
that there was no appropriate relief that a District Court could fashion.
The approach of the United States Supreme Court has not been
to adopt a threshold test in determining whether to exercise judicial review
of military matters. Rather, the Court has developed the separate
community doctrine in applying the Bill of Rights to the armed forces.
This is the current approach of the United States Supreme Court in deciding
claims involving military matters.
In a series of cases, beginning in 1974, the Supreme Court has
maintained that the armed forces is a "separate community" in which
greater than usual restrictions on individual liberty are necessary. 184 The
separate community doctrine has been justified only in very general terms
and the Court has stated that the vital function of the military has required
the Court to defer to Congress or to the military hierarchy in constitutional
matters.
The separate community doctrine was reaffirmed by a majority of
the United States Supreme Court in its most recent decision involving
the military. In Chappell v. Wallace (1983),185 five black enlisted men
launched a tort action against their superior officers for violations of
their constitutional rights. The plaintiffs alleged that in making duty
assignments, assessing their performance, and imposing penalties, their
superior officers discriminated against them because of their race.
The United States District Court dismissed the action on "the grounds
that the actions complained of were non-reviewable military decisions,"
that the officers against whom the claim was brought were entitled to
immunity, and that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative
remedies. 86
The enlisted men appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, which reversed the decision of the District Court. The Court
of Appeals cited Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau
of Narcotics (1971), 187 which authorized the award of damages for
constitutional violations by federal officials even though Congress has
184 Parker v. Levy (1974), 417 U.S. 733; Secretary of the Navy v. Avrech (1974), 418 U.S.
676; Schlesinger v. Ballard (1974), 419 U.S. 498; Schlesinger v. Councilman, supra, note 149; Greer
v. Spock (1976), 424 U.S. 828; Middendorf v. Henry, supra, note 120; Brown v. Glines (1980),
444 U.S. 348; Rostker v. Goldberg (1981), 453 U.S. 57.
185 103 S. Ct. 2364.
186 The members, according to the Court, should have first used the complaint system provided
within the military under UCMJ, supra, note 115, Art. 138.
187 403 U.S. 388.
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not expressly authorized such suits. Following the decision of the Court
of Appeals, the officers appealed to the Supreme Court.
The u.s. Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals
and held that enlisted military personnel may not maintain an action
to recover damages from a superior officer for alleged constitutional
violations. Burger C.J. delivered the judgment of the Court. He stated
that the need for special regulations in relation to military discipline
requires a special and exclusive system of military justice. Civilian courts
must, at the very least, hesitate long before tampering with the established
relationship between enlisted personnel and their officers. Burger C.J.
concluded:
The special nature of military life, the need for unhesitating and decisive action
by military officers and equally disciplined responses by enlisted personnel, would
be undermined by a judicially created remedy exposing officers to personal liability
at the hands of those they are charged to command.
188
The Chief Justice emphasized that the Court does not hold that military
personnel are barred from all redress in civilian courts for constitutional
violations suffered during the course of military service. However, the
Court exercises caution when the matter interferes "with the relationships
that define military life and the power of the military to deal with its
own personnel."189
Professor Hirschhorn aptly summarized the separate community
doctrine as consisting of four propositions:
First, as a matter of observation and history, the armed forces are a distinct subculture
in which the individual is subordinated to the organization in a manner unlike
any other government activity. Second, the existence of this peculiar relationship
is evidence that it rationally serves both the armed forces' internal purposes and
the larger society's interests. Third, when individual rights appear to conflict with
the smooth working of the armed forces, the Court distrusts its own ability to
reconcile them without harming military effectiveness. Fourthly, its exceptional
reluctance to intervene on behalf ofjudicially developed individual rights is justified
because the purpose of the armed forces, "to fight wars", is fundamentally different
from any other government activity. 190
In my opinion, the separate community doctrine is an unfortunate
development within the jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court. The
doctrine grants far too much deference to the discretion of military
authorities at the expense of constitutional rights - an approach that
seems to conflict with the status that a democracy accords to its
188 Supra, note 184 at 2367.
189 Ibid at 2367.
190 J.M. Hirschhorn, "The Separate Community: Military Uniqueness and Serviceman's Con-
stitutional Rights" (1984) 62 N.C.L. Rev. 177.
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constitution. Certain members of the judiciary have recognized this, and
the separate community doctrine has been subjected to much criticism
in dissenting opinions in the military cases.
In Greer v. Spock (1976),9' the U.S. Supreme Court again invoked
the separate community doctrine and upheld a Fort Dix regulation that
prohibited the distribution of political leaflets and the holding of political
meetings on Fort Dix property. (The post permitted free civilian access
to certain unrestricted areas.)
The dissenting judgments of Brennan J. and Marshall J. were very
critical of the separate community doctrine relied upon by the majority.
After pointing out that the Fort Dix areas in question were so open
that there was a danger of muggings after payday and a problem with
prostitution, Brennan J. stated:
The Court's opinion speaks in absolutes, exalting the need for military preparedness
and admitting of no careful and solicitous accommodation of First Amendment
interests to the competing concerns that all concede are substantial. It parades
general propositions useless to precise resolution of the problem at hand. According
to the Court, "it is the primary business of armies and navies to fight or be ready
to fight wars should the occasion arise" . . . [and] "it is consequently the business
of a military installation like Fort Dix to train soldiers, not to provide a public
forum".... But the training of soldiers does not as a practical matter require
exclusion of those who would publicly express their views from streets and theater
parking lots open to the general public.'
92
Marshall J. joined in dissent, stating:
I am deeply concerned that the Court has taken its second step in a single day1
93
toward establishing a doctrine under which army military regulation can evade
searching constitutional scrutiny simply because of the military's belief - however
unsupportable it may be - that the regulation is appropriate.
194
The deference to military authority, which the Court grants under
the rubric of the separate community doctrine, runs contrary to the guiding
principles of a constitutional democracy. Clearly if constitutional rights
are to mean anything at all, military regulations should not be upheld
when they infringe these rights, unless the military authorities establish
by evidence that their regulations are necessary to promote military
efficiency.
Additionally, the separate community doctrine is based on antiquated
ideas of military society that no longer hold true for modem armed forces.
191 Supra, note 184.
192 Ibid. at 851.
193 Justice Marshall is referring to Middendorf v. Henry, supra, note 120, which was decided
the same day as Greer v. Spock.
194 Supra, note 184 at 872-73.
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The current body of military law dates back to Richard II (1377-1399).
Although the punishments in the ancient Articles of War'95 were very
severe, the substantive content of the crimes has changed very little over
time. The British Articles of War of 1878 were very similar to those
promulgated by Richard II in the fourteenth century. In 1879, the British
Parliament consolidated these Articles with the Mutiny Act96 in a newly
enacted statute entitled the Army Discipline and Regulation Act. The new
statute was re-enacted as the Army Act'97 of 1881. This Act was the
historical foundation for the Code of Service Discipline under the National
Defence Act. Many of the provisions of the United States Unifonn Code
of Military Justice have similar roots that can be traced to ancient British
military law.
The military law that is currently in force, in both Canada and the
United States, was developed for a military organization very different
in nature from today's armed forces. For example, the Army and Navy
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were isolated from British
society, often for extended campaigns under arduous conditions. The
officers originated from radically different classes of society than did
other service personnel and this was reflected in the disparity of the
conditions under which each group served. The so-called 'volunteer' troops
were drawn from the lowest ranks of society, often forced into service
by press gangs or offered the chance to volunteer following a conviction
in the criminal courts. Military law was seen as a necessary means of
keeping the reluctant, unskilled troops in line. Its effectiveness was
guaranteed through the sheer swiftness and harshness with which the
officers administered the law. 98
Since the Second World War there has been a gradual convergence
of military and civilian social structures. 9 9 The modem military is very
much a part of larger society and is no longer the isolated community
of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. One reason for this change
lies in the sheer number of personnel involved. The modern armed forces
requires vast numbers of personnel who carry out specialized tasks.
195 Articles of War applied to the military only during times of declared war. They were
promulgated under the authority of the Monarch under Royal Prerogative.
196 The Mutiny Act was the statutory enactment of military law that governed the military
in times of peace. In 1689, the British Parliament enacted the first Mutiny Act. Prior to that, only
the Articles of War applied to the military, and only during war. The Mutiny Act provided for
a Standing Army in peacetime, only with consent of Parliament.
197 Supra, note 29.
198 D. Corry, "Two Standards of Justice: Military Law and its application to the Officers
and Men of the British Army in the 18th and 19th Centuries" (1984) [unpublished].
199 A.D. Biderman & L.M. Sharp, "The Convergence of Military and Civilian Occupational
Structures" (1968) 73 Am. J. Sociology 381.
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Nations maintain huge standing armies. Members of the peace-time armed
forces spend much time in the civilian community. Many civilians will
have spent at least some time in military service. The relationship between
the military and civilian societies is one of constant interaction.
Technological advances have vastly changed the nature of modem
warfare. In order to obtain competent personnel to operate very sophis-
ticated equipment, the armed forces of today requires a highly trained
recruit. 200 Very few positions in the military are capable of being filled
by unskilled personnel. This has had a profound impact on the modem
military. First, the backgrounds of the officers and the enlisted personnel
are similar in many respects. The vast disparity in education and social
class has virtually disappeared. Second, most recruits enter the military
following high school or after spending some time in the work force.
They bring into the armed forces the values and experiences that have
been nurtured in civilian society. Basic military training can only build
on these values; it cannot change them. Third, given the education and
experience of today's enlisted personnel, they are, for the most part,
responsible and mature individuals. Most are willing to accept their duties
responsibly and carry them out to the best of their ability. They are
a far cry from the vagabonds, scoundrels, and criminals who formed
the ranks of the British Army of yesteryear.
Furthermore, today's armed forces has a much larger logistical
component than the military of the past. Over 80 percent of the personnel
today are in support positions. Therefore, the vast majority of service
personnel not only spend most of their time in the civilian community,
but they also perform jobs like those held by civilians.201 The effectiveness
of the logistical-administrative component of the service does not depend
on discipline, but rather on business and managerial skills.
Even in the combat positions, the nature of warfare and the skills
required to fight in a war have changed considerably over the years.
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, armies had to be assembled
in a common battleground and the battle was fought in a contained
geographical area. In a modem theatre of war, units are dispersed over
a large geographical area. Wars are fought on a continental or global
scale. There is a constant threat that the enemy will intercept commu-
nications between units and, therefore, communications are kept to a
minimum. Equipment is operated by highly trained specialists. The
200 M. Janowitz, ed., The New Military (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1964); M. Janowitz,
The Professional Soldier (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1964).
201 The New Military, ibid
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personnel must be capable of exercising their initiative and making
instantaneous decisions.
Traditional military training emphasized discipline and blind obe-
dience to command. In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries,
the morale of the troops was often overlooked. Frequent use of the
lash and the harsh administration of military law at the discretion of
officers ensured that the troops carried out their duty. This type of dis-
cipline - a discipline of fear - is only effective so long as it is powerful
enough to overcome the countervailing fear and the arduous conditions
that the troops face in combat. The moment that discipline of fear breaks
down, the troops will mutiny.202
Discipline is equally important in the modem military, particularly
in combat positions. However, it is a discipline of a very different nature.
In a modern armed force, discipline and morale go hand in hand. Even
if a modern army has the most up-to-date equipment and the most arduous
training, without both discipline and morale that army is destined to
failure.
Military law is essential for discipline in today's armed forces, but
only as the means of last resort. If morale is high, the service personnel
will be motivated to carry out their duties, and there will be little need
to resort to the military law. However, if morale is low and the service
personnel do not believe in the cause for which they are fighting, discipline
can only be maintained by frequent resort to a harsh system of military
law.
Morale will only be high in an armed force that upholds the ideology
and values of its personnel. The modem military is no longer a separate
community in any real sense. Therefore, the military cannot develop
a separate ideology and system of values, but rather must reflect those
of the society of which it is a part. Today there is far more pressure
on the military to foster a harmonious relationship with the civilian
community. The armed forces is controlled by civilian politicians.
Volunteers are drawn from a civilian labour force. The armed forces
must rely on the support of the civilian community. If military values
are radically different from civilian values, the civilian community may
withdraw its support and the military will suffer. There will be fewer
volunteers to fill the ranks and, because morale will be low, disgruntled
personnel will leave. Furthermore, there will be considerable political
pressure on the military organization. Government funds will be chan-
202 Corry, supra, note 199.
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nelled elsewhere and the civilian politicians may lobby for a restructuring
of the armed forces.203
The point is that the application of constitutional norms should help
to foster the necessary harmony between the forces and civilian society
rather than hamper military efficiency. The Constitution reflects those
values that are most fundamental in Canadian society. If the military
system ofjustice is unfair and arbitrary, or if it is unnecessarily disrespectful
of constitutional rights, this will have a profound effect on the morale
of service personnel.
Another concern about the separate community doctrine relates to
the opinion of military experts. The primary objective of military leaders
is to control their personnel in the interests of military efficiency. This
includes controlling the views, attitudes, and conduct of personnel who
do not share the personal or bureaucratic preferences of the military
hierarchy.204 The officers justify this in the name of military discipline
and efficiency, yet there may be other appropriate courses of action
available that are less offensive to the rights of the service personnel.
Finally, why should greater deference be granted to decisions that
affect the rights of service personnel than to any other claim involving
the exercise of legislative power? In the United States for example, one
would think that matters of internal security are equally as important
as matters of external security. Yet in United States v. United States District
Court (1972),205 the Supreme Court recognized a legitimate government
need to safeguard domestic security through wiretapping but held that
this need did not prevent scrutiny under the provisions of the Bill of
Rights, particularly when the surveillance threatened the right to privacy
and free expression under the First Amendment. The Court held that
the government's concerns did not justify departure from the customary
requirement to obtain judicial approval prior to surveillance. Nor did
the Court find that this requirement would impair surveillance powers
to any significant degree.
Certainly the goals of the military are important and few would
support interference by the civil courts in military matters when there
is a genuine threat to discipline and efficiency. However, the separate
community doctrine does not strike the proper balance between military
discipline and constitutional rights. The difficult task that the Canadian
203 G.G. Simmonds, "Commentary and Observations" in Hi. Massey, ed., The Canadian Military:
A Profile (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1972) at 267-90.
204 For example, during the Vietnam War years, there were considerable political and legal
challenges to the American military. Some of the anti-military sentiment spilled over into Canada,
and the Canadian Forces faced chronic recruiting problems.
205 407 U.S. 297.
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courts face is devising a test under section 1 of the Charter that strikes
the appropriate balance. In my opinion, a test has been employed by
the courts that does meet this difficult challenge: the least restrictive
means test.
This test has been applied by the U.S. Supreme Court in military
cases prior to 1974. In Toth v. Quarles (1955),206 Black J., writing for
the u.s. Supreme Court, held that:
There are dangers lurking in military trials which were sought to be avoided by
the Bill of Rights and Article HI of our Constitution. Free countries of the world
have tried to restrict military tribunals to the narrowestjurisdiction deemed absohtely
essential to maintaining discipline among troops in active service.20 7 [Emphasis added.]
The principles recited by the Court in Toth v. Quarles were applied
by the Supreme Court, in 1957, in Reid v. Covert208 and, in 1969, in
O'Callahan v. Parker.20 9 These cases, also discussed earlier, considerably
narrowed the jurisdiction of military law over civilian personnel and over
offences that were not service connected.
The least restrictive means test was also suggested by McIntyre J.
in MacKay v. The Queen2 o as an appropriate test under section 2(f) of
the Canadian Bill of Rights. McIntyre J. pointed out that the valid federal
objective test employed by the majority in MacKay did not consider
whether subjection of service personnel to military trials for offences
under the general law could be justified as valid under the Bill of Rights.
He stated the following as an appropriate formulation of what constitutes
a valid federal objective:
The question which must be resolved in each case is whether such inequality
as may be created by legislation affecting a special class - here the military
- is arbitrary, capricious or unnecessary, or whether it is rationally based and
acceptable as a necessary variation from the general principle of universal
application of law to meet special conditions and to attain a necessary and desirable
social objective.
21'
McIntyre J. then proposed the following test:
I would be of the opinion.., that as a minimum it would be necessary to inquire
whether any inequality ... has been created rationally in the sense that it is not
arbitrary or capricious and not based upon any ulterior motive or motives offensive
to provisions of the Canadian Bill of Rights, and whether it is a necessary departure
206 Supra, note 132.
207 Ibid at 22.
208 Supra, note 137.
209 Supra, note 141.
210 Supra, note 40.
211 Ibid. at 423.
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from the general principle of universal application of the law for the attainment
of some necessary and desirable social objective. Inequalities created for such
purposes may well be acceptable under the Canadian Bill of Rights.
2 12
He then added that departures from the principle of equality before the
law "should be countenanced only where necessary for the attainment
of desirable social objectives, and then only to the extent necessary in
the circumstances to make possible the attainment of such objectives."2'3
Applying this principle to the military, McIntyre J. emphasized that the
civil rights of service personnel "should be affected as little as possible
considering the requirements of military discipline and the efficiency of
the service." 214
In my view, McIntyre J. has proposed an accurate and workable
test for the application of constitutionally enshrined rights to the military.
He recognizes that no such right is absolute and must, therefore, be limited
in some circumstances. However, infringement or denial of such rights
should only be done for reasons of public policy, and then only to the
extent necessary to attain the desired objective. Section 1 of the Charter
provides that the Charter is only subject to such reasonable limits as
can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. At the
very least, section 1 requires the courts to engage in a balancing test
that weighs the rights in question and the needs of the military. The
word 'demonstrably' suggests that cogent evidenice must be tendered that
upholds the contribution of military law to military efficiency and
discipline, in the particular case before the court.2 5 Of the different
doctrines considered, only the least restrictive means test provides
sufficient protection for important constitutional guarantees, while at the
same time permitting some departure from those absolute principles when
necessary.
Based on this analysis, many aspects of the present system of military
justice are an infringement under section l(d) of the Charter. The
summary trial and the court-martial process do not provide a fair hearing
by an independent and impartial tribunal.
212 Ibid at 423.
213 Ibid at 424.
214 Ibid at 424.
215 Recent decisions of the Court Martial Appeal Court have not applied the least restrictive
means test in the case of challenges to military jurisdiction. Rather, the court has adopted the
military nexus test. Where there is some connection between the offence charged and military
efficiency, morale, and discipline the courts refuse to intervene in military affairs. This approach
is akin to the separate community approach adopted by the U.S. courts. See R v. Sullivan, supra,
note 169; R v. Catudal, supra, note 168; R v. MacEachern, supra, note 167; and R v. MacDonald,
supra, note 162.
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VI. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
A reformed system of military justice must consider the right of
service personnel to a fair hearing before an independent and impartial
tribunal. At the same time, the system proposed must ensure that military
discipline and efficiency are maintained at an optimal level.
Minor offences of a military nature must remain within thejurisdiction
of the Commanding Officer. He or she is responsible for the troops under
his or her command. However, as the summary trial infringes the Charter,
the Commanding Officer's powers of punishment must be limited in
order to exclude them from the scope of section 11 (d). If the powers
of punishment were limited to disciplinary powers only, then the Com-
manding Officer could be said to be exercising jurisdiction over dis-
ciplinary matters rather than criminal offences. As section 1 l(d) only
applies to persons charged with an 'offence', the section would not apply
to disciplinary matters. Therefore, the Commanding Officer should not
be able to sentence an offender to a period of detention; sentences of
this nature should be imposed by court martial only. The Commanding
Officer would still be able to pass sentences such as limited fines,
confinement to barracks, extra work and drill, reprimands, and other
punishments that are clearly disciplinary rather than criminal in nature.
The experiences of other jurisdictions are noteworthy. For example,
following the bitterness of World War II, most West Germans blamed
the system of military justice for many of the injustices of Nazi
authoritarianism. It was, therefore, felt that reforms of the military justice
system were necessary to achieve the goal of a democratic army of
"citizens in uniform." 216 In 1954, the West German Constitution was
amended to permit the re-establishment of the Armed Forces. Shortly
after that, in 1956, the West German Parliament enacted the Soldiers
Act, which grants service personnel the same rights and duties as other
citizens, subject only to specified restrictions in the Act that are justified
by military necessity. Under the Act, 'soldiers' representatives' in each
unit must be consulted by the Commanding Officer in matters of discipline.
One of the reforms carried out in Germany was to restrict the powers
of the commander in matters of discipline. Under the Military Disciplinary
Regulations, a company commander has jurisdiction for minor offences.
Disciplinary punishments which include a reprimand, limited fines,
imposition of curfews, and up to seven days' disciplinary arrest may
be administered. Punishment of disciplinary arrest must be approved by
a judge of the service court, who is a civilian. Also, when the judge
216 See E.F. Shermian, "Military Justice Without Military Control" (1973) 82 Yale L.i. 1398.
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so approves, there is a right of appeal to the full service court, which
is a civil court specializing in military law.
In spite of these reforms, the West German Armed Forces has a
good record, and has experienced no significant morale and disciplinary
problems. 217
Reform of the court-martial system should also be considered. One
of the problems with the current system is that its jurisdiction extends
beyond the enforcement of military offences. The jurisdiction of the Code
of Service Discipline should be limited to military personnel only. Furth-
ermore, it should apply only to military offences. Offences under the
general law should be handled by the civil courts.
218
Another problem with the court-martial process is that it is totally
dominated by officers. The judge, the prosecutor, the court, and often
the defence counsel are all military officers. There is a need to establish
an independent legal branch to administer military law.
Certain reforms of the British system of military justice are worthy
of consideration,2' 9 although I would suggest that they must be extended
over all forms of court martial. In 1946, the Report of the Army and
Air Force Courts-Martial Committee recommended a separation of func-
tions in courts martial. Following this report, in 1947, the British legal-
aid program was extended to provide for civilian representation for
personnel facing court martial. In 1948, the Directorate of Army and
Air Force Legal Services was established as an independent prosecutorial
agency of military lawyers. Also in that year, a separate civilian Judge
Advocate General's Office was created to provide judicial officers for
courts martial. The Office is composed of the civilian Judge Advocate
General and some twenty judicial officers or Judge Advocates, who are
also civilians. In 1972, only 28 per cent of the courts martial had a
Judge Advocate presiding.
Canada should follow the model of the British reforms, but should
also provide a broader role for the Judge Advocates. The Office of the
Judge Advocate should be expanded and a Judge Advocate should preside
over all courts martial.
In addition, the Judge Advocate should control the conduct of the
trial and rule on procedural motions, the admissibility of evidence, and
motions in which the prosecution has failed to establish a prima facie
case. He or she should be the sole judge on matters of law and should
217 Ibid at 1412-13.
218 Specifically, s. 120 of the National Defence Act, supra, note 4 should be repealed or struck
down.
219 Sherman, supra, note 216 at 1403ff.
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be responsible for a summation to the court at the end of the trial. After
a finding of guilt, the Judge Advocate will impose the sentence. In fact,
the Judge Advocate should be a specialist in military law and perform
the same functions as a judge at a criminal trial.
In order to ensure that the Judge Advocate's Office remains in-
dependent of all military control, the Judge Advocates should be appointed
as judges under section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867. This would
provide all the necessary safeguards enjoyed by civilian judges of the
high courts.
All courts martial should be presided over by a Judge Advocate.
He or she should sit alone for minor offences, in which case powers
of punishment should be restricted to two years or less. For more serious
offences, a jury-like system should replace the current officer-dominated
court martial. The Judge Advocate will preside; however, a full twelve-
person jury should be selected from officers and enlisted personnel of
the Armed Forces who have had some years of service. All will have
expertise in military matters to some extent, and yet will form a reasonably
independent panel to establish questions of fact.
VII. CONCLUSION
The present system of military justice in Canada violates section
11 (d) of the Charter. The summary trial process is completely controlled
by the Commanding Officer who has extensive powers of punishment
over the personnel under his or her command. The court-martial system
is command dominated. It is instituted by a convening officer, often with
the recommendations of a Commanding Officer. The Judge Advocate,
if there is one, is an officer. The prosecutor is a member of the Forces.
Finally, the court martial is composed of a panel of officers. By majority
decision, they control all matters including findings of law, findings of
fact, and the sentence imposed. This system provides service personnel
with an inferior system of criminal justice.
The Charter of Rights and Freedoms, as it applies to the Canadian
Forces, dictates that reforms of the military system of justice must be
undertaken. The proposed reforms would provide a fair and impartial
system of military justice for service personnel and yet would provide
military discipline and efficiency. Many of these reforms have been carried
out effectively in Great Britain and West Germany. The result would
be an improved system of military justice that safeguards the constitutional
rights of service personnel and one that is compatible with the modern
military organization.
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